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I. INTRODUCTION

Article 20, Paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea (hereafter ITLOS Statute) reads: "[t]he Tribunal shall
be open to entities other than State Parties . . . in any case submitted

pursuant to any other agreement conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal
which is accepted by all the parties to that case."' Article 21 of the same
Statute provides that "[t]he jurisdiction of the Tribunal comprises all
1. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Annex VI of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) art. 20(2), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/conventionagreements/texts/
unclos/unclose.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2006) (emphasis added).
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disputes and all applications submitted to it in accordance with this
Convention [the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
hereafter UNCLOS] 2 and all matters specifically provided for in any
other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal. 3 In addition,
under Article 22, "[i]f all the parties to a treaty or convention already in
force and concerning the subject-matter covered by this Convention so
agree, any disputes concerning the interpretation or application of such
treaty or convention may, in accordance with such agreement, be submitted
to the Tribunal." 4
Article 16 of the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin
Tuna (hereafter the SBT Convention) 5, which was adopted on May 10,
1993 and became effective on May 5, 1994, states that "[i]f any dispute
arises between two or more of the Parties concerning the interpretation
or implementation of this Convention [the SBT Convention], those
Parties shall consult among themselves with a view to having the dispute
resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice." 6 From
April 18-21, 2001 the Commission for the Conservation of Southern
Bluefin Tuna (hereafter CCSBT) held its Seventh Annual Meeting, and
during the meeting adopted the Resolution to Establish an Extended
Commission and An Extended Scientific Committee (hereafter the April
2001 CCSBT Resolution). 7 According to paragraph 6 of this Resolution,
any entity or fishing entity, a vessel flagged which has caught Southern
Bluefin Tuna (SBT) at any time in the previous three calendar years,

2. See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 391. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Oceans
and Law of the Sea: Chronological lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions
to the Convention and the Related Agreements as at November 2, 2006, http://www.un.
org/depts/los/referencefiles/chronological lists of ratifications.htm (152 states and
entities are parties to the UNCLOS).
3.

ITLOS, supranote 1, art. 21 (emphasis added).

4. ITLOS, supranote 1, art. 22.
5. See generally Convention for the Conservation of the Southern Bluefin Tuna,
May 10, 1993, 1819 U.N.T.S. 359 (entry into force May 20, 1994) [hereinafter SBT
Convention], available at http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about the commission/
convention.pdf.
6. Id. art. 16.
7. Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, Resolution to
Establish an Extended Commission and an Extended Scientific Committee and Rules of
Procedureof the Extended Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna,

adoptedApril 18-21, 2001 (revisedOct. 7-10, 2003), http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about the
commission/theExtendedcommission.pdf.

may express its willingness to the Executive Secretary of the CCSBT to
become a member of the Extended Commission. The Executive Secretary
of the Commission, on behalf of the CCSBT, will conduct an Exchange
of Letters with the representative of such entity or fishing entity to this
effect. 8
From October 15-18, 2001, during the 8th Annual Meeting of the
CCSBT, the Taiwanese representative expressed its willingness to
become a member of the Extended Commission, and agreed to accept an
initial allocation of SBT at 1,140 metric tons (mt). 9 On December 28,
2001, the Executive Secretary of the CCSBT, Brian Macdonald, sent a
letter to the Administrator of the Fisheries Administration, Council of
Agriculture, Mr. Hu Sing-hwa, on the basis of the April 2001 CCSBT
Resolution requesting the Fishing Entity of Taiwan to apply to become a
member of the Extended Commission.' 0 On December 31 of that same
year, Administrator Hu Sing-hwa sent a letter back expressing his
acceptance of this invitation. 1 On January 1, 2002, following the procedure
of the Exchange of Letters, the Executive Secretary sent notification that
the case of Taiwan's application had already been accepted, and requested
that Taiwan complete relevant domestic legal procedures. 12 On August 30,
2002, Taiwan formally became a member of the Extended Commission of
the CCSBT.
Although Taiwan is unable to become a contracting party to the SBT
Convention due to political considerations, it qualified as a member of
the Extended Commission of the CCSBT through the said Exchange of
Letters. By becoming a member of this regional fishery management
organization, Taiwan enjoys rights and obligations "virtually" equal to
those of other CCSBT members. These rights and responsibilities include
undergoing negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or other peaceful means
to resolve possible fisheries disputes arising from the interpretation and
implementation of conservation and management measures of the SBT
Convention. In accordance with paragraph 2 of the April 2001 CCSBT
Resolution, "[a]ny dispute concerning the interpretation or implementation

8. Id.para. 6.
9. See Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, MAFF Update

No. 430 (Nov. 2, 2001), http://www.maff.go.jp/mud/430.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2006).

10.

Letter from Brian Macdonald, Executive Secretary, CCSBT, to Mr. Hu Sing-

hwa, Administrator of the Fisheries Administration, Council of Agriculture (Dec. 28,
2001) [hereinafter Dec. 28, 2002 Letter] (on file with author).

11.

Letter from Mr. Hu Sing-hwa, Administrator of the Fisheries Administration,

Council of Agriculture, to Brian Macdonald, Executive Secretary, CCSBT (Dec. 31,
2001) [hereinafter Dec. 31, 2001 Letter] (on file with author).
12. Letter from Brian Macdonald, Executive Secretary, CCSBT, to Mr. Hu Sing-

hwa, Administrator of the Fisheries Administration, Council of Agriculture (Jan. 8,
2001) [hereinafter Jan. 8, 2002 Letter] (on file with author).
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of this Resolution, including the articles of the [SBT] Convention specified
in the Resolution, or the Exchange of Letters referred to in paragraph 6,
shall be resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration
or other peaceful means agreed by the parties to the dispute."13
On the basis of the aforementioned legal regulations, once a fishery
dispute arises in the future between Taiwan and another CCSBT member
that cannot be resolved through negotiation, or other methods of nonjudicial or para-judicial third party dispute settlement, will it be possible
for the dispute to be referred to the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea (hereafter ITLOS) for judicial settlement? If so, according to
which legal grounds? If not, what is the reason?
The main purpose of this paper is to assess the possibility of judicial
settlement of fishery disputes involving the fishing entity of Taiwan and
examine the legal questions regarding jurisdiction over the disputes.
This analysis is based on the articles related to dispute settlement that are
provided in the SBT Convention, the ITLOS Statute and the international
law of the sea 14 and the judicial practice of the ITLOS and other relevant
arbitration courts in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case.15 Following this
introductory section, Section II describes the establishment of the CCSBT
and the selection and application of the methods of dispute settlement
provided in the SBT Convention. Section III examines the disputes
between the members of CCSBT and other fishing entities, in particular
Taiwan, over the agreed dispute settlement mechanisms that are based
on the interpretation and application of the relevant conventions,
agreements, resolutions, exchange of letters, or other fisheries conservation
and management measures. Section IV explains the legal foundation for
13.
14.

April 2001 CCSBT Resolution, supra note 7.
See generally UNCLOS, supra note 2; Agreement for the Implementation of

the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 10 December
1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Dec. 4, 1995, Temp. State Dep't No. 104-24 [hereinafter
the UNFSA], availableat http://www.un.org/Depts/los/conventionagreements/texts/

fish stocksagreement/CONF164 37.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2006); Agreement to Promote
Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing
Vessels on the High Seas, Nov. 24, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 968 (hereafter HSCA) available at
http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/MEETING/003/X3130m/X3130EO0.HTM.

See Oceans and

Law of the Sea: Chronological lists of Ratifications supra note 2 (As of November 2,
2006, the UNCLO had 152 contracting parties, the UNFSA had 61 contracting parties).
As of March 7, 2006, 33 countries and the European Community had deposited their
instruments of acceptance of the HSCA. United Nations, FAO, http://www.fao.org/
legal/treaties/012s-e.htm (ratification of the HSCA).
15. Infra notes 62 & 63.

the jurisdiction of ITLOS over relevant fishery disputes referred to it for
judgment. Section V examines the issue of whether "entities other than
State parties" can become parties to a case that is referred to ITLOS. In
Section VI, the judicial practice exercised in the Southern Bluefin Tuna
case is cited to help discuss the issue concerning whether ITLOS has
jurisdiction over the SBT case and thus can render final ruling over the
dispute in the case. Section VII examines how a fishing dispute occurring
between Taiwan and CCSBT members should be resolved; in particular,
it addresses the possibility for Taiwan to refer the disputes to ITLOS for
judgment, and discusses the question of whether ITLOS can exercise
jurisdiction over a fisheries dispute involving Taiwan as a fishing entity.
Lastly, Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. CCSBT MEMBER STATES AND THE SELECTION AND APPLICATION
OF THE METHODS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

The CCSBT is a regional fishery management organization established in
May 1994 by Japan, Australia and New Zealand with the objective to
ensure, through appropriate management, the conservation and optimum
utilization of the global SBT fishery. The CCSBT is currently the only
regional fishery management organization established for the purpose of
conserving one single fish stock, namely, SBT. After 1961, when the
worldwide SBT total catch reached a historic height of 81,605 metric
tonnes (mt), subsequent catches then dropped off sharply, showing that
resources were already depleted. Faced with a rapidly decreasing catch
rate, the fishing nations concerned (Australia, Japan and New Zealand)
had no choice but to reach a consensus on settling a total allowable catch
of SBT and began to apply strict quotas to their fishing fleets in 1985 as
a management and conservation measure to enable the SBT stocks to
rebuild. The objective of the CCSBT established in 1994 is to return
fishing stocks to 1980 levels by the year 2020 through limiting catches.
In pursuit of the Commission's objective, the CCSBT performs a number of
functions, such as strengthening assessment of stocks by carrying out
research work, monitoring the SBT stocks, setting catch allocation,
reaching cooperative arrangements with non-member fishing States,
monitoring other SBT fishing related activities, and adopting effective
preventive measures. Long before the CCSBT was established, the three
member states of Australia, New Zealand and Japan had already adopted
measures for limiting catches, with a total allowable
catch (TAC) from
6
1989 on maintained at approximately 11,750 mt.'
16. See Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, About the
Commission, http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/about-s.htrnl (last visited Sept. 4, 2006).
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Due to SBT being caught by Taiwanese fishing boats in its traditional
fishing grounds in the Atlantic, Indian and the Atlantic Oceans before
the establishment of the CCSBT, and with these fish catches being
exported mainly to Japan, the CCSBT requested Taiwanese representatives
to nominally participate as observers in its conferences every year since
its establishment. On the other hand, for the purpose of protecting its
operational rights and interests, every year Taiwan has dispatched
representatives to participate in the conferences as observers, and to
cooperate with the CCSBT by adopting the requested conservation and
management measures. As stated in Section I, starting from August
2002, Taiwan became a member of the Extended Commission of the
CCSBT, enjoying "virtually" the same rights and responsibilities as other
member States of the organization. As for the distribution of CCSBT
fishing quotas, Taiwan, being a member of the CCSBT Extended
Commission, has the same allotted quota as South Korea, a CCSBT
member. As of January 2005, the CCSBT had four member States (Australia,
New Zealand, Japan and South Korea), five Extended Commission
members (Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan),
and one cooperating non-member, the Philippines. The total CCSBT
allowable catch for SBT set for 2004-2005 was 14,930 mt, including
6,065 mt allotted to member State Japan, 5,265 mt allotted to member
State Australia, 1,140 mt allotted to member State South Korea, 1,140
mt allotted to Extended Commission member Taiwan, 420 mt allotted to
member State New Zealand and 50 mt allotted to the Philippines as a
cooperating non-member. Indonesia and South Africa will be allotted a
quota of 800 mt and 45 mt of SBT respectively if their application for
becoming cooperating non-members is approved by the CCSBT."7
Of the five members of the CCSBT (including members and Extended
Commission members), Australia ratified and became a Party to the
UNCLOS in 1994. New Zealand, Japan and South Korea all became
Parties to the UNCLOS in 1996. Taiwan is unable to sign, accede to, or
ratify the 1982 UNCLOS due to political factors, and therefore is not a
contracting party to this Convention. Nevertheless, the Taiwanese
government clearly expressed that, based on the principles of fairness,
reciprocity and equality, Taiwan would voluntarily abide by the relevant

17. See Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, Management
of SBT: Catch Levels, http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/management.html (last visited Sept. 4,
2006).

regulations of the UNCLOS. Of the five members of the CCSBT,
Australia became a party to the UNFSA in 1999 and New Zealand in
2001, but South Korea, Japan and Taiwan are not parties to the same
agreement. Japan ratified the HSCA in 2000, South Korea in 2003, New
Zealand in 2005, and Australia in 1996. (See Table 1) Thus, the
members of the CCSBT, in addition to being bound by the articles
related to dispute settlement provided in the SBT Convention, are also
obligated to abide by the relevant dispute resolution procedures
stipulated in Part XV of the UNCLOS and Part VIII of the UNFSA. In
addition, as Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea are all
parties to the HSCA, they must also abide by the regulations regarding
dispute settlement provided in Article 9 of that agreement.
Under Article 287(1) of the UNCLOS:
When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter,
a State shall be free to choose, by means of a written declaration, one or more of
the following means for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation
or application of this Convention: (a) the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea established in accordance with Annex VI; (b) the International Court of
Justice (c) an arbitral tribunal in accordance with Annex VII; (d) a special
arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with
Annex VIII for one or more of
18
the categories of disputes specified therein.

Amongst the CCBST member States, only Australia has made this
choice. On March 21, 2002, Australia made a declaration, according to
the regulations specified in Article 287 of the UNCLOS, that for the
settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the
Convention, they would choose the methods of ITLOS and the
International Court of Justice (hereafter ICJ). 19 Japan, New Zealand and
South Korea have not made declarations concerning dispute resolution
methods. Thus, according to the regulations of Article 287(3) of the
1982 UNCLOS, arbitration methods for dispute settlement should be
adopted in accordance with Annex VII of this Convention. 2° But Article
287(4) of the UNCLOS has another regulation which reads, "If the
parties to a dispute have accepted the same procedure for the
settlement of the dispute, it may be submitted only to that procedure,
unless the parties otherwise agree.,, 2' Article 287, paragraph 5, of the
same Convention also states: "[i]f the parties to a dispute have not
18. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 287, para. 1.
19. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Oceans and Law of the
Sea: Declarations and Statement (August 29, 2006), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
convention_agreements/convention declarations.htm.
20. See UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 287, para. 3 ("A State Party, which is a party
to a dispute not covered by a declaration in force, shall be deemed to have accepted
arbitration in accordance with Annex VII.").
21. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 287, para. 4.

InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea

[VOL. 8: 37, 2006]

SAN DIEGO INT'L L.

accepted the same procedure for the settlement of the dispute, it may be
in accordance with Annex VII, unless the
submitted only to arbitration
22

parties otherwise agree.9

TABLE 1: CCSBT MEMBERS' RATIFICATION OF 1982 UNCLOS,
UNFSA, 1993 HSCA, AND 1993 SBT CONVENTION

1982
UNCLOS

1995
UNFSA

1993
HSCA

1995

1993 SBT
Convention

24 June 1996 10 May 1993
Founding
member
20 June 2000 10 May 1993
Founding
member
14 July 2005 10 May 1993
Founding
member
24 Apr. 2003 Became
member
17 Oct. 2001

1.

Australia

5 Oct. 1994

23 Dec. 1999

2.

Japan

20 June 1996

7 Aug. 2006

3.

New Zealand 19 July 1996

18 Apr. 2001

4.

South Korea

29 Jan. 1996

Not yet
ratified

5.

Taiwan

Unable to
ratify

Unable to
ratify

Unable to
ratify

6.

Phillippines

8 May 1984

Not yet
ratified

Not yet
ratified

Became
Extended
Commission
member 30 Aug.
2002
Became
cooperating
non-member
2 Aug. 2004

Tabulated by author. Notes: The 1982 UNCLOS became effective on November 16,
1994; the 1994 UNFSA became effective on December 11, 2001; The 1993 HSCA
became effective on April 24, 2003; and the 1993 SBT Convention became
effective on May 20, 1994.

As Australia, Japan, and New Zealand are Parties to the UNFSA, they
are obliged to go through negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation,
22.

UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 287, para. 5.

arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own
choosing for the settlement of disputes according to the regulations of
Article 27 of this Agreement. In addition, Article 30(1) of the UNFSA
states that the regulations of Part XV of the UNCLOS relevant to
dispute settlement apply to any disputes regarding the interpretation
or implementation of the Agreement between contracting parties to the
UNFSA (Australia and New Zealand), whether or not these countries are
parties to the UNCLOS. Article 30(2) of the UNFSA states that the
regulations for dispute settlement in Part XV of the UNCLOS apply to
any disputes arising between parties to the UNFSA (Australia and New
Zealand) related to the interpretation and implementation of a regional,
sub-regional or global fisheries agreements related to straddling fish
stocks or highly migratory fish stocks to which they are parties including
any dispute concerning the conservation and management of such stocks
and no matter whether these states are contracting parties to the
UNCLOS. Due to the fact that Australia made the declaration in
accordance with Article 287 of the UNCLOS regarding the selection of
methods of dispute settlement in 2002, it is obligated to use ITLOS or
ICJ to resolve disputes in accordance with Article 30, paragraph 3 of the
UNFSA, unless Australia, when signing, ratifying, or acceding to the
UNFSA, or at any time thereafter, accepts another procedure provided in
Article 287 of the UNCLOS (that is, arbitration or special arbitration) to
resolve the dispute regulated in Part VIII of the UNFSA. Lastly, Article
30, paragraph 5, of the UNFSA provides that
[a]ny court or tribunal to which a dispute has been submitted under this part
shall apply the relevant provisions of the Convention, of this Agreement and of
any relevant subregional, regional or global fisheries agreement, as well as
generally accepted standards for the conservation and management of living
marine resources and other rules of international law not incompatible with the
Convention, with a view to ensuring the conservation of the straddling fish
stocks and highly migratory fish stocks concerned.

As Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea are parties to the
HSCA, under Article 9 of this agreement, they are also obligated to seek
consultations with other parties on any dispute with regard to the
interpretation or implementation of the provisions of the HSCA with a
view to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. In the event that the
dispute is not resolved through these consultations within a reasonable
period of time, the parties in question shall consult amongst themselves
as soon as possible with a view to having the dispute settled by negotiation,
inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other
peaceful means of their own choice. Any dispute not so resolved, with
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the consent of all parties concerned, should be referred to the ICJ or
ITLOS for judicial settlement or proceed to arbitration.23
III. THE SELECTION OF MEANS OF SETTLEMENT IN THE EVENT
THAT A LEGAL DISPUTE OCCURS BETWEEN
CCSBT MEMBERS AND TAIWAN
While Taiwan is excluded from signing, ratifying or acceding to the
UNCLOS, the UNFSA, the HSCA, and the SBT Convention because of
the complex political issues and its unique status under international law,
the entry into force of these conventions and agreements have legal
utility for the interpretation or implementation of Taiwan's participation
in sub-regional, regional or global fisheries conservation and management
organizations. In particular, Article 1,paragraph 3 of the UNFSA provides
that "[t]his Agreement applies mutatis mutandis to other fishing entities
whose vessels fish on the high seas." Article 8, paragraph 3 of the same
Agreement reads:
...States

fishing for the stocks on the high seas and relevant coastal States shall
give effect to their duty to cooperate by becoming members of such
organization or participants in such arrangement .... States having a real

interest in the fisheries concerned may become members of such organization or
participants in such arrangement. The terms of participation in such
organization or arrangement shall not preclude such states from membership or
participation; nor shall they be applied in a manner which discriminates against
24
any State or group of States having a real interest in the fisheries concerned.

Under Article 10 of the UNFSA, "[i]n fulfilling their obligation to cooperate
through subregional or regional fisheries management organizations or
arrangements, States shall: ... (i) agree on means by which the fishing
interests of new members of the organization or new participants in the
arrangement will be accommodated., 25 In addition, Article 11 of the
same agreement also states that
[i]n determining the nature and extent of participatory rights for new members
of a subregional or regional fisheries management organization, or for new
participants in a subregional or regional fisheries management arrangement,
States shall take into account, inter alia, . . . (b) the respective interests, fishing
patterns and fishing practices of new and existing members of participants; (c)
the respective contributions of new and existing members or participants to

23.
24.
25.

HSCA, supra note 14, art. 9, para. 3.
UNFSA, supra note 14, art. 8, para. 3.
UNFSA, supra note 14, art. 10.

conservation and management of the stocks, to the collection and provision
,,26
of accurate data and to the conduct of scientific research on the stocks ....

With regard to the disputes arising from the interpretation and application
of the SBT Convention, the Exchange of Letters, and the resolutions
adopted by the CCSBT concerning the conservation and management of
SBT, would the procedures provided within Part VIII of the UNFSA
concerning dispute settlement be applied to Taiwan and other CCSBT
member states who are also contracting parties to the UNFSA (namely,
Japan, Australia and New Zealand) in accordance with Article 1(3)27 of
the same agreement? Moreover, with regards to the CCSBT, once
disputes arise related to the interpretation and implementation of the
April 2001 CCSBT Resolution (including the relevant provisions clearly
mentioned in the SBT Convention, or the Exchange of Letters referred to
in the text of paragraph 6 of the Resolution), Taiwan and the member
States of the CCSBT (Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea)
should go through "negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration
or any other peaceful means" of their own choice for dispute resolution. 28 It
should be noted that here is omission of text referring to judicial settlement
in the second paragraph of the April 2001 CCSBT Resolution. Does this
imply that once a dispute occurs between Taiwan and CCSBT member
States regarding the interpretation or application of the April 2001 CCSBT,
they are unable to send the dispute to the ITLOS for judicial settlement?
On April 20, 2001, at the 7th Annual Meeting of CCSBT, the Resolution
to Establish an Extended Commission and Extended Scientific Committee
was adopted in accordance with the regulations provided in Article
8(3)(b) of the SBT Convention. 29 Under Article 8(7), the contracting parties
to the SBT Convention (Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea)
are bound by this resolution. 30 However when the resolution was adopted,
Japan put forward the following statement: "[i]n agreeing to the
resolution, Japan advised that in relation to the Government of Japan its
agreement was on the basis of interpreting the reference to the Exchange
of Letters as not meaning an exchange of diplomatic documents."'" The
26. UNFSA, supra note 14, art. 11.
27. See UNFSA, supra note 14, art. 1, para. 3 (stating "[t]his Agreement applies
mutatis mutandis to other fishing entities whose vessels fish on the high seas.").
28. April 2001 CCSBT Resolution, supra note 7, para. 2.
29. See SBT Convention, supra note 5, art. 8, para. 3 (stating "For the conservation,
management and optimum utilisation of southern bluefin tuna: (b) the Commission may,
if necessary, decide upon other additional measures.").
30. See SBT Convention, supra note 5, art. 8, para. 7 (stating "All measures
decided upon under paragraph 3 above shall be binding on the Parties.").
31. See Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, Report of the
Seventh Annual Meeting of the Commission, Sydney, Australia, April 18-21 2001, para.
23, http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meetingreports/ccsbt_7/report of ccsbt7.pdf.
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other member states of the CCSBT did not make these kinds of
statements.
After the adoption of the April 2001 CCSBT Resolution, the Taiwan
representative to the CCSBT 8th Annual Meeting expressed the intention of
Taiwan to apply for membership of the Extended Commission of the
32
CCSBT, and accepted the proposed SBT fishing quota of 1,140 mt.
On December 28, 2001, on the basis of the text of Paragraph 6 of the
Resolution, 33 the Executive Secretary of the CCSBT, Brian Macdonald,
sent a letter to the Administrator of Taiwan's Fisheries Administration,
Mr. Hu Sing-hwa, inviting Taiwan to apply to become a member of the
34
Extended Commission of the CCSBT as the "Fishing Entity of Taiwan."
The Exchange of Letters between the CCSBT Executive Secretary,
representing the CCSBT, and Taiwan completed the procedure for
admission.
It is worth emphasizing that the letter of invitation of the CCSBT
Executive Secretary and the Exchange of Letters between the CCSBT
and Taiwan, both refer to the rights and responsibilities of Taiwan as a
member of the Extended Commission. The letter of invitation of the
CCSBT Executive Secretary states:
. . . Provisions of the [SBT] Convention related to the Commission and
Scientific Committee (Articles 6 to 9, except for 6.9 and 6.10) apply mutatis
mutandis to the Extended Commission and to the Extended Scientific Committee.
All Members of the Extended Commission that are not Members of the
Commission are entitled to participate fully in all subsidiary working groups and
other bodies involved in cooperative work pursuant to the [SBT] Convention....
I hereby assure you that all Members of the Extended Commission that are not
Members of the Commission are entitled to enjoy the same rights and
obligations with other Members of the Extended Commission in decisionmaking of the Extended Commission related to work under the [SBT]
Convention. I draw to your attention provisions of the Resolution that provide a
strong practical assurance of the rights of all Members of the Extended
Commission in decision-making. In particular, paragraph 4 of the Resolution
provides that decisions reported from the Extended Commission to the
Commission will become decisions of the Commission unless the Commission
decides to the contrary.

32. See MAFF Update, supra note 9.
33. See April 2001 CCSBT Resolution, supra note 7, para. 6 (stating "Any entity
or fishing entity, vessels flagged to which have caught SBT at any time in the previous
three calendar years, may express their willingness to the Executive Secretary of the
Commission to become a member of the Executive Commission.").
34. Dec. 28, 2001 Letter, supra note 10.

Further, any decision of the Commission that affects the operations of the
Extended Commission or the rights, obligations or status of any individual
Member within the Extended Commission should not be taken without prior due
deliberation of that issue by the Extended Commission.
In accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Commission and the Extended
Commission, all decisions must be taken by a unanimous vote of Members
present. It would be contrary to an important principle of international law, i.e.
"good faith", if a Member of the Extended Commission that took part in a
unanimous decision by the Extended Commission subsequently voted to the
contrary in decision-making by the Commission. It follows that Taiwan would
be bound only by the decisions of the Extended
Commission, to which we
35
would require Taiwan's firm commitment.

On December 31, 2001, Administrator of Taiwan's Fisheries Administration
replied by letter that he accepted this invitation. However, it was
expressed in his replying letter that, on the basis of the application of
Article 20, mutatis mutandis, of the SBT Convention, Taiwan would
preserve the right to withdraw from the CCSBT Extended Commission
by sending a written notice to the Executive Secretary of the Commission
one year previously.36 On January 8, 2002, following the procedure of
the Exchange of Letters, the Executive Secretary of the CCSBT sent a
letter informing Taiwan that the application of the membership of the
CCSBT Extended Commission had already been approved, and requested
Taiwan to complete relevant domestic legal procedures.37 The agreement
reached in the letter of invitation of the Executive Secretary of the
CCSBT and the Exchange of Letters between Taiwan and the CCSBT
confirms that Taiwan and other CCSBT Extended Commission members
enjoy the same rights and responsibilities. After completing the relevant
domestic legal procedures, on August 30, 2002, Taiwan formally
became a member of the CCSBT Extended Commission and Extended
Scientific Committee. According to paragraph 2 of the April 2001 CCSBT
Resolution, any dispute that arises concerning the interpretation or
implementation of this Resolution (including the relevant provisions of the
SBT Convention specified in the Resolution, or the Exchange of Letters
referred to in paragraph 6 of the Resolution) between Taiwan and
CCSBT member States (Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South
Korea) shall be resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation,
38
arbitration or other peaceful means agreed by the parties to the dispute.
35. Id.
36. Dec. 31, 2001 Letter, supra note 11.
37. Jan. 8, 2002 Letter, supra note 12.
38. See April 2001 CCSBT Resolution, supra note 7, para. 2 ("Any dispute
concerning the interpretation of implementation of this Resolution, including the articles
of the Convention specified in the Resolution, or the Exchange of Letters referred to in
paragraph 6, shall be resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration
or other peaceful means agreed by the parties to the dispute.").
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Despite this, as mentioned previously, paragraph 2 of the April 2001
CCSBT Resolution sedulously excludes judicial resolution as a means of
dispute settlement. However can the text of "or other peaceful means of
resolution agreed by the parties to the dispute" contained in paragraph 2
of the April 2001 CCSBT Resolution be interpreted as including sending
the dispute to ITLOS for judicial settlement? This issue will be
addressed in more detail in Section VII.
IV.

THE JURISDICTION OF

ITLOS

OVER FISHING DISPUTES

ITLOS was established in August 1996 according to the relevant
provisions of the UNCLOS after the election of 21 judges, as a new
international judicial institution in the Free and Hanseatic City of
Hamburg, Germany. 39 ITLOS is also one of the judicial bodies referred
to in Part XV of the UNCLOS that can settle disputes related to the
interpretation and application of this Convention.4 °
From the 1997 trial of the M!V "Saiga case" until the present, ITLOS
has tried 13 cases in total, respectively M/V "Saiga" Case (No. 1), M/V
"Saiga" Case (No. 2), Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (No. 3 and 4), the
"Camouco" case (No. 5), the "Monte Confurco" case (No. 6), the Case
Concerningthe Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish
Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (No. 7), the "GrandPrince"
Case (No. 8), the "ChaisiriReefer 2" Case (No. 9), The MOXPlant Case
(No. 10), The "Volga" Case (Russian Federation v. Australia) (No. 11),
Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the
Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore) (No. 12), and the "Juno Trader"
Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea Bissau) (No. 13).41
39.

For general information on the ITLOS, visit the Tribunal's website at: http://

www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
40. See UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 287, para. 1 states:

When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time
thereafter, a State shall be free to choose, by means of a written declaration,
one or more of the following means for the settlement of disputes concerning
the interpretation or application of this Convention: (a) the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in accordance with Annex VI;
(b) the International Court of Justice; (c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in
accordance with Annex VII; (d) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in
accordance with Annex VIII for one or more of the categories of disputes
specified therein.
41. See International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Proceedings and JudgmentsList of Cases, http://www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/list-of cases.pl?language=en (last visited Sept.
5, 2006).

From the thirteen cases mentioned above, apart from number 7 (the Case
Concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish
Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean) which is still not resolved,
ITLOS has made a ruling or issued an order on the other twelve cases.
According to Article 292 of the 1982 UNCLOS, ITLOS has made all
judgments on case numbers 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, and 13 correlated to jurisdiction
over prompt release of vessels and crews.42 Judgments on cases number
3, 4, 10, and 12 were made according to Article 290 of the UNCLOS,
where any provisional measures may be prescribed by the court if it
considers appropriate under the circumstances to preserve the respective
rights of the parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the
marine environment.4 3 These judicial practices demonstrate that ITLOS
42. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 292 states:
(1)Where the authorities of a State Party have detained a vessel flying the flag
of another State Party and it is alleged that the detaining State has not complied
with the provisions of this Convention for the prompt release of the vessel or
its crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other financial security, the
question of release from detention may be submitted to any court or tribunal
agreed upon by the parties or, failing such agreement within 10 days from the
time of detention, to a court or tribunal accepted by the detaining State under
article 287 or to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, unless the
parties otherwise agree. (2) The application for release may be made only by or
on behalf of the flag State of the vessel. (3) The court or tribunal shall deal
without delay with the application for release and shall deal only with the
question of release, without prejudice to the merits of any case before the
appropriate domestic forum against the vessel, its owner or its crew. The
authorities of the detaining State remain competent to release the vessel or its
crew at any time. (4) Upon the posting of the bond or other financial security
determined by the court or tribunal, the authorities of the detaining State shall
comply promptly with the decision of the court or tribunal concerning the
release of the vessel or its crew.
Id.
43. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 290 states:
(1) If a dispute has been duly submitted to a court or tribunal which considers
that primafacie it has jurisdiction under this Part or Part XI, section 5, the
court or tribunal may prescribe any provisional measures which it considers
appropriate under the circumstances to preserve the respective rights of the
parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment,
pending the final decision; (2) Provisional measures may be modified or
revoked as soon as the circumstances justifying them have changed or ceased
to exist; (3) Provisional measures may be prescribed, modified or revoked
under this article only at the request of a party to the dispute and after the
parties have been given an opportunity to be heard; (4) The court or tribunal
shall forthwith give notice to the parties to the dispute, and to such other States
Parties as it considers appropriate, of the prescription, modification or revocation
of provisional measures; (5) Pending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal to
which a dispute is being submitted under this section, any court or tribunal
agreed upon by the parties or, failing such agreement within two weeks from
the date of the request for provisional measures, the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea or, with respect to activities in the Area, the Sea-Bed
Disputes Chamber, may prescribe, modify or revoke provisional measures in
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indeed plays an important role in international fishery disputes, especially
with regard to judicial settlement of fishery disputes involving the
speedy release of vessels and crews.
The foundation of the legal jurisdiction enjoyed by ITLOS in
international fishery disputes includes: (1) the articles relevant to dispute
settlement of the UNCLOS; (2) the articles relevant to dispute settlement
of the UNFSA; (3) when parties to a multilateral treaty explicitly agree
to refer disputes to ITLOS for settlement; (4) when disputing States,
whether they are parties to the UNCLOS, the UNFSA, or the HFCA,
conclude an agreement (usually called compromis or special agreement)
to refer disputes to ITLOS for settlement; (5) Part XI of the UNCLOS
related to disputes arising over deep seabed mining activities; and (6)
other matters to which ITLOS has jurisdiction. 4 This paper does not
include discussion of the court's jurisdiction over disputes arising from
deep seabed activities or other advisory jurisdiction, since it is related
less to the international fishery disputes. A more detailed examination
of items 1-4 that form the foundation of the legal jurisdiction enjoyed by
ITLOS follows:
A. Jurisdictionof ITLOS Under Relevant Articles of the UNCLOS
According to the choice of methods for dispute settlement provided in
Article 287 of the UNCLOS, if a state when signing, ratifying or
acceding to this Convention chooses ITLOS to resolve disputes related
to the interpretation or implementation of articles of the UNCLOS, then
ITLOS has jurisdiction over the dispute. Under Article 288 of the same
Convention, ITLOS also has jurisdiction over any disputes, referred to it
in accordance with Part XV of the UNCLOS, over the interpretation and
application of the provisions contained in the Convention, and any disputes
which are referred to the Tribunal according to the international
agreements which are relevant to the purpose of the UNCLOS, over the
accordance with this article if it considers that primafacie the tribunal which is

to be constituted would have jurisdiction and that the urgency of the situation
so requires. Once constituted, the tribunal to which the dispute has been
submitted may modify, revoke or affirm those provisional measures, acting in
conformity with paragraphs 1 to 4; (6) The parties to the dispute shall comply
promptly with any provisional measures prescribed under this article.
Id.
44.

See generally GUDMUNDUR EIRIKSSON, THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE

LAW OF THE SEA at 111-44 (2000) (stating ITLOS jurisdiction includes contentious
jurisdiction and advisory jurisdiction).

interpretation and application of the agreements concerned. As to the
question concerning whether ITLOS has jurisdiction over a dispute, it
should be decided by a ruling from ITLOS. For example, Australia and
Canada have made a declaration choosing ITLOS as one of the methods
of judicial settlement to be used when disputes occur related to the
interpretation or application of the UNCLOS. However, it is important to
note, even though the contracting parties to the UNCLOS have chosen
ITLOS as one of the methods of judicial settlement to be used when
disputes occur related to the interpretation or application of the UNCLOS,
the jurisdiction of ITLOS is limited because, under Article 297 or Article
298 of the UNCLOS, the parties concerned have the right to request the
disputes related to fisheries, maritime boundary delimitation, and military
related activities to be excluded from the jurisdiction of ITLOS. Article
297 (3)(a) of UNCLOS states that:
Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of this
Convention with regard to fisheries shall be settled in accordance with section
2, except that the coastal State shall not be obliged to accept the submission to
such settlement of any dispute relating to its sovereign rights with respect to the
living resources in the exclusive economic zone or their exercise, including its
discretionary powers for determining the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity, the
allocation of surpluses to other States and the terms and 45
conditions established
in its conservation and management laws and regulations.

According to Article 290(1) of the UNCLOS,
[if] a dispute has been duly submitted to a court or tribunal which considers that
prima facie it has jurisdiction . . . the court or tribunal may prescribe any
provisional measures which it considers appropriate under the circumstances to
preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute or to prevent serious
harm to the marine environment, pending the final decision.

In addition, paragraph 5 of the same Article states that
[p]ending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal to which a dispute is being
submitted under this section, any court or tribunal agreed upon by the parties or,
failing such agreement within two weeks from the date of the request for
provisional measures, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ... may
prescribe, modify or revoke provisional measures in accordance with this article
if it considers that primafaciethe tribunal which is to be constituted would have
jurisdiction and that the urgency of the situation so requires. Once constituted,
the tribunal to which the dispute has been submitted may modify, revoke or
affirm those provisional measures, acting in conformity with paragraphs 1 to 4.

According to this, ITLOS also has jurisdiction when parties to the UNCLOS
request that provisional measures be prescribed.

45.

UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 297, para. 3(a).
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ITLOS also has jurisdiction over disputes arising related to the
interpretation of regulations regarding the prompt release of vessels and
crews on the basis of Article 292(1) of the UNCLOS. This Article states:
Where the authorities of a State Party have detained a vessel flying the flag of
another State Party and it is alleged that the detaining State has not complied
with the provisions of this Convention for the prompt release of the vessel or its
crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other financial security, the
question of release from detention may be submitted to any court or tribunal
agreed upon by the parties or, failing such agreement within 10 days from the
time of detention, to a court or tribunal accepted by the detaining State under
article 287 or to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, unless the
parties otherwise agree.

B. JurisdictionofITLOS Under Part VIII of the UNFSA
The settlement of disputes referred to in Part VIII of the UNFSA is
very relevant to the dispute settlement procedures provided in Part XV
of the UNCLOS, mainly because under Article 30(1) of the UNFSA, the
dispute over the interpretation and application of the Agreement is to be
settled by using the same legal regime for dispute settlement that is
provided in the UNCLOS. Accordingly, unless the parties to the UNFSA
have already reached agreement on another means of dispute settlement
in accordance with Article 280 of the UNCLOS, 46 for disputes related to
the interpretation or application of the UNFSA, the UNCLOS dispute
settlement procedures will apply. Thus, under Article 30(1) of the 1995
UNFSA, the provisions relating to the settlement of disputes set out in
Part XV of the UNCLOS apply mutatis mutandis to any dispute between
States Parties to this Agreement concerning the interpretation or application
of this Agreement whether or not these states are also parties to the
UNCLOS. Moreover, Article 30(2) of the UNFSA states that the provisions
relating to the settlement of disputes set out in Part XV of the UNCLOS
apply mutatis mutandis to any dispute between State Parties to this
Agreement concerning the interpretation or application of a sub-regional,
regional or global fisheries agreement relating to straddling fish stocks or
highly migratory fish stocks to which they are parties, including any dispute
concerning the conservation and management of such stocks, whether or
not they are also Parties to the Convention. Furthermore, according to
46.

UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 280 ("Nothing in this Part impairs the right of any

States Parties to agree at any time to settle a dispute between them concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention by any peaceful means of their own
choice.").

Article 30(3) of the UNFSA, unless that State Party, when signing, ratifying
or acceding to this Agreement, or at any time thereafter, has accepted
another procedure pursuant to Article 287 of the UNCLOS for the settlement
of disputes (that is, arbitration or special arbitration), the disputing
parties should go to ITLOS or ICJ for resolution.
C. JurisdictionofITLOS Under MultilateralTreaties, in Which Parties
Agree to Refer Their Disputes to the Tribunalfor Settlement
Article 21 of the ITLOS Statute states: "[t]he jurisdiction of the
Tribunal comprises all disputes and all applications submitted to it in
accordance with this Convention and all matters specifically provided
47
for in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal.
Article 22 of the same Statute reads: "[i]f all the parties to a treaty or
convention already in force and concerning the subject-matter covered
by this Convention so agree, any disputes concerning the interpretation
or application of such treaty or convention may, in accordance with such
agreement, be submitted to the Tribunal. 4 8 Accordingly, for example,
the parties to the HSCA, which entered into force on April 24, 2003, can
use ITLOS as a method of resolving disputes arising from interpretation
or application of the provisions contained in the HSCA in accordance
with Article 9(3) of the Agreement. In other words, ITLOS has jurisdiction
over the dispute on the basis of the so called "compromise clause"
provided in multilateral treaties. Similarly, if in agreement, parties to the
Convention for Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory
Fishing Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific or the SBT Convention
can also choose to send disputes to ITLOS for resolution. It should be noted
here that the wording "any other agreement" mentioned in Article 21 of
the ITLOS Statute is the same as the wording contained in Article 20 of the
same Statute, which are not limited to agreements between States or
international organizations, but also includes autonomous federations or
territories, and the agreements signed by States and other entities. However,
some scholars have pointed out, if based on the regulations of Article 1(4)
of the ITLOS Statute, it seems that whether ITLOS has jurisdiction over
certain disputes or not is greatly limited by Article 288 of the UNCLOS.
That is to say that the wording of "any other agreement" contained in
Article 21 of the ITLOS Statute should be strictly interpreted.4 9

47.
48.
49.

ITLOS, supra note 1, art. 21.
Id. art. 22.
EIRIKSSON, supra note 44, at 113.
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D. JurisdictionofITLOS Under an Agreement ConcludedBetween
Parties to a Dispute That Refer Their Disputes to
ITLOS for Settlement
When a party to a certain dispute signs an agreement with the other
party to the dispute, agreeing to send their dispute to ITLOS for settlement,
ITLOS has jurisdiction over this dispute. This "special agreement"
concluded by the parties to the dispute, is usually called "compromise."
Article 24(1) of the ITLOS Statute provides that "[d]isputes are
submitted to the Tribunal, as the case may be, either by notification of a
special agreement or by written application, addressed to the Registrar.
In either case, the subject of the dispute and the parties shall be indicated."
Article 280 of the UNCLOS states that nothing impairs the right of any
States Parties to agree at any time to settle a dispute between them
concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention by any
peaceful means of their own choice. This so-called "any peaceful means"
naturally includes referring disputes to ITLOS for judicial settlement.
In addition, parties to a dispute can undergo the method of so-called
"forum prorogatum" and refer disputes to ITLOS for trial. However,
before ITLOS has jurisdiction over the dispute, it must obtain the
consent from the other party later.
V. CAN "ENTITIES OTHER THAN STATE PARTIES" BECOME
PARTIES TO A CASE BEFORE ITLOS?

Article 20(2) of the ITLOS Statute reads: "[t]he Tribunal shall be open
to entities other than States Parties in any case expressly provided for in
Part XI or in any case submitted pursuant to any other agreement
conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal which is accepted by all the
parties to that case." In the first situation, "Entities other than State
parties" have the possibility to become Parties to the "Seabed Disputes

50. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Rules of the Tribunal, U.N. Doc.
ITLOS/8 (April 27, 2005), available at http://www.itlos.org/documents-publications/
documents/Itlos.8.E.27.04.05.pdf (stating according to Item 5
[w]hen the applicant proposes to found the jurisdiction of the Tribunal upon a
consent thereto yet to be given or manifested by the party against which the
application is made, the application shall be transmitted to that party. It shall
not however be entered in the List of Cases, nor any action be taken in the
proceedings, unless and until the party against which such application is made
consents to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for the purposes of the case.).

Chamber" or the "Special Tribunal" set up under ITLOS.5' It is unclear
what the exact meaning of the last half of Article 20(2) of the ITLOS
Statute regarding access to the Tribunal is, in particular pursuant to "any
other agreement." There are differing viewpoints about whether this
should be interpreted more strictly or broadly.
Chandrasekhara Rao, former President of ITLOS points out that the
stipulations of Article 20 of the ITLOS on access to the Tribunal mainly
implements Article 291, paragraph 2 of the UNCLOS, 52 which reads that
"[t]he dispute settlement procedures specified in this Part shall be open
to entities other than States Parties only as specifically provided for in
this Convention., 53 Article 21 of the ITLOS Statute further stipulates
that "[t]he jurisdiction of the Tribunal comprises all disputes and all
applications submitted to it in accordance with this Convention and all
matters specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers
jurisdiction on the Tribunal. 5 4 Moreover, Article 22 of the same Statute
reads: "[i]f all the parties to a treaty or convention already in force and
concerning the subject-matter covered by this Convention so agree, any
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of such treaty or
convention may, in accordance with such agreement, be submitted to the
Tribunal. 55 However should the wording "any other agreement" mentioned
above in the ITLOS Statute be "international agreement" as stipulated in
Article 288, paragraph 2, of the UNCLOS? 56 Chandrasekhara Rao believes
that the wording "any other agreement" mentioned in Article 20 of the
ITLOS Statute excludes standard domestic legal contracts, and applicable
targets should be agreements bound by international law. Despite this,
so long as this Agreement correlates with the objective of the UNCLOS,
it can enable entities other than State Parties to become Parties to the
UNCLOS.57 Dr. Hubertus W. Labes also supports this view. He believes
that Article 21 and 20(2) of the ITLOS Statute refer to "agreement" and
not "international agreement" which broadens the jurisdiction of ITLOS. 5 8

51.

See UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 188.

THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA: LAW AND PRACTICE 7
(P. Chandrasekhara Rao & Rahmatullah Khan eds., 2001).
53. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 291(2).
54. ITLOS, supra note 1, art. 21.
55. ITLOS, supra note 1, art. 22.
56. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 288, para. 2 ("A court or tribunal referred to in
article 287 shall also have jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of an international agreement related to the purposes of this Convention,
which is submitted to it in accordance with the agreement.").
57. THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA: LAW AND PRACTICE,
supranote 52, at 7-8.
58. Hubertus W. Labes, Jurisdiction of the Law of the Sea Tribunal for (private)
Arbitration Procedures 30 (Mar. 2, 2000) (unpublished paper, presented at the Annual
52.
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Another European scholar Bernard Vanheule points out that the concepts
embodied in the UNCLOS are definitely a gray area. Nevertheless,
ITLOS must have jurisdiction over these disputes according to the
articles contained in the UNCLOS, treaties or conventions, as well as
relevant regulations under international agreements. In addition, if entities
other than state parties want to get access to ITLOS they must "specifically",
"expressly" refer to the UNCLOS, other related treaties or conventions,
or international agreements. 59 American legal scholar Bernard H. Oxman
believes that because Article 20 and Article 21 of the ITLOS Statute use
the wording "agreement" and omit deliberately the word "international",
and given the fact that the wording "treaty" or "convention" referred to in
Article 22 of the same Statute is different from the use of "agreement", a
freer and broader interpretation of the meaning of "any other agreement"
is a more correct one. 60 Lastly, the first President of ITLOS, Thomas A.
Mensah, adopts quite a cautious viewpoint towards the issue of whether
the use of "agreement" in Articles 20 and 21 of the ITLOS Statute
means an "international agreement." He points out that only when there
is a case referred to ITLOS for trial based on an agreement, then
according to the relevant circumstances, the Tribunal can give a clearer
answer to the issue of whether the "agreement" referred to in Articles 20
and 21 of the ITLOS Statute 61
must be regarded as referring to an
"international agreement" or not.

Meetings of the Association for the Advancement of Insurance Science, Hamburg,
Germany, on file with author).
59. Bernard Vanheule, Arrest of Seagoing Vessels and the LOS Convention: Does
the New InternationalTribunalfor the LOS Offer New Prospects?, 5 INT'L MAR. L. 106,
112-13 (1998).
60. Bernard H. Oxman, Does the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
Have Jurisdiction over Disputes with Taiwan? 12 (Dec. 10, 2004) (unpublished paper,
presented at International Symposium on the Law of the Sea and Taiwan, on file with
author).

61.

Thomas A. Mensah, The Jurisdictionof the InternationalTribunalfor the Law

of the Sea, 63 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT (F.R.G.) 337 (1999) (presentation held at Common

Symposium of the Max-Planck Institute of Foreign and Private International Law and the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea).

VI. THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION IN THE "SOUTHERNBLUEFIN
TUNA CASE" AND THE ORDER OF ITLOS AND THE
AWARD OF THE ANNEX VII ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL

In 1999 ITLOS rendered its order and prescribed certain provisional
measures in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan;
Australia v. Japan) (Provisional Measures) according to Article 290,
paragraph 5, of the LJNCLOS 62 and in August 2000 the Arbitral Tribunal
constituted under Annex VII of the UNCLOS rendered its award in the
Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Australia and New Zealand v. Japan)
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility). 63 The disputing parties in these cases,
namely, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, are all parties to the SBT
Convention, 64 and the UNCLOS, 65 and therefore are bound by the
provisions contained in these two treaties, including the obligation to
abide by the relevant provisions concerning the dispute settlement
procedures.
In these two cases, Japan claimed that the settlement of disputes
between Japan and Australia/New Zealand concerning the conservation
and management of SBT should be resolved in accordance with the
dispute settlement procedure provided in Article 16 of the SBT Convention.
Accordingly, both ITLOS and the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal would
have no jurisdiction over these disputes. Australia and New Zealand had
a differing viewpoint, arguing that Article 16 of the SBT Convention
does not exclude the application of Part XV of the UNCLOC concerning
mandatory procedure for dispute settlements. Accordingly, both ITLOS
and the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal had jurisdiction over the disputes
arising from SBT conservation and management measures between
Australia, New Zealand and Japan. According to Article 288, paragraph

62.

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases

(N.Z. v. Japan; Austi., Japan) (Provisional Measures), Aug. 27, 1999, 38 I.L.M 1624, at
1631-32 (1999).

63.

See Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Under Annex VII of the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Austl. &
N.Z. v. Japan) (Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility), Aug. 4, 2000, 39, I.L.M. 1359
(2000).
64. See SBT Convention, supra note 5, art. 17 (stating that Australia, New Zealand

and Japan on May 10, 1993 signed the Convention for Conservation of Southern Bluefin
Tuna and this Convention became effective on May 20, 1994).

65. See Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Oceans and Law of the
Sea: Chronological lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention
and the Related Agreements as at November 2, 2006, supra note 2 (stating that on

October 5, 1994 Australia became a State Party to the UNCLOS; Japan became a State
Party on June 20, 1996 and New Zealand became a State Party to the same Convention
on July 19, 1996).
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4, of the UNCLOS, "[i]n the event of a dispute as to whether a court or
tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by decision of that
court or tribunal." On August 27, 1999, ITLOS ruled that it had jurisdiction
over the "Southern Bluefin Tuna (Provisional Measures) Case." However,
on August 4, 2000, the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal decided that it was
without jurisdiction to rule in the "Southern Bluefin Tuna (Jurisdiction
and Admissibility) Case." The background of the "Southern Bluefin Tuna"
Case, judicial proceedings, and the rulings over the issue of jurisdiction
are addressed below.
66
A. The Backgroundof the "Southern Bluefin Tuna " Case

At the first conference held after the establishment of the CCSBT in
1994, the three founding members, Australia, New Zealand and Japan
66.
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COMp. L. Q. 447, 447-52 (2001); Tim Stephens, A Paper Umbrella Which Dissolve in the
Rain" Implications of the Southern Bluefin Tuna Casefor the Compulsory Resolution of
Disputes Concerningthe Marine Environment Under the 1982 LOS Convention, 6 ASIA
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passed a resolution setting TAC of SBT at 11,750 mt, with national
allocations set at: Japan (6,065 mt), Australia (5,265 mt) and New
Zealand (420 mt). However since 1998, the CCSBT had been unable to
reach agreement regarding TAC of SBT and thus Australia, New
Zealand and Japan decided to maintain the TAC level decided in 1994.67
The main reason that they were unable to reach a consensus was that
Japan believed the SBT stocks were already recovered, and therefore the
TAC of SBT could be increased. Australia and New Zealand both
thought differently, arguing that if they wanted to return to the 1980
levels of SBT stocks by 2020, CCSBT member States should not
increase SBT catch amounts. At the same time, Japan submit a proposal
to the Commission, which increased the TAC of SBT set in 1994 by
6,000 mt and half of the increased TAC, that is, 3,000 mt, being allotted
to Japan. In addition, Japan also proposed to reach an agreement with
Australia and New Zealand to set up a joint Experimental Fishing
Program (EFP), whose particular goals were studying the SBT amount
to help verify if the SBT stocks had indeed been recovered, and reducing
the degree of scientific uncertainty regarding the number of SBT stocks.
Thereafter, despite vigorous protests by Australia and New Zealand over
pursuance of any unilateral EFP, Japan conducted the pilot program in
the summer of 1998 which was to last for three years. Under the
program, in addition to the allotted 6,605 mt as mentioned earlier, Japan
also increased its SBT catch by 1,464 mt.68 Australia and New Zealand
lodged their protests over the Japanese unilateral act, and immediately
requested to have urgent dialogue with Japan according to Article 16 of
the SBT Convention.
In May 1999, Japan informed Australia and New Zealand that unless
they accepted Japan's proposal to start implementation of the joint
experimental fishing program in 1999, Japan would recommence unilateral
experimental fishing program on June 1 of that year. Australia and New
Zealand found Japan's suggestion unacceptable, and indicated that if
Japan started direct unilateral implementation of the EFP, that would
constitute termination of negotiations under Article 16 of the SBT
Convention. However, Japan began unilateral implementation of the EFP
on June 1, 1999, and at the same time replied that it had no intention of
terminating the consultations with Australia and New Zealand. It also
maintained that the independent scientific opinion, that was reported to
the Commission, supported Japan's EFP proposals. 9 On June 23, 1999,
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See UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal: Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, supra note 63,

at 1366.
68.
69.

See id. at 1367.
See id.
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Australia restated its position that the dispute did not relate solely to
Japan's obligations under the SBT Convention, but also involved its
obligations under the UNCLOS and customary international law. Also
on June 23, 1999, Japan stated that it was ready to have the dispute
resolved by mediation under the provisions of the SBT Convention.
Australia replied that it was willing to submit the dispute to mediation,
provided that Japan agreed to cease its unilateral experimental fishing
and that the mediation was expeditious. On July 14, 1999, Japan reiterated
its position that its EFP was consistent with the SBT Convention and
that it could not accept the condition set by Australia for mediation to
proceed. Japan declared again that it was ready to have the dispute
resolved by mediation pursuant to Article 16, paragraph 2 of the SBT
Convention. While indicated it was not prepared to halt its unilateral
EFP, Japan expressed its willingness to resume consultations with
Australia and New Zealand. Thereafter Australia notified Japan that it
viewed Japan's position as a rejection of Australia's conditional acceptance
of mediation, and that Australia had decided to commence compulsory
dispute resolution under Part XV of the UNCLOS. It followed that it did
not accept Japan's proposal for arbitration pursuant to Article 16(2) of
the SBT Convention. Australia emphasized the centrality of Japan's
obligations under UNCLOS and under customary international law and the
need for those obligations to be addressed if the dispute were to be
resolved. Australia reiterated its view that the conduct of Japan under
the 1993 Convention was relevant to the issue of its compliance with the
UNCLOS obligations and may be taken into account in dispute settlement
under Part XV of the same Convention. Pending the constitution of the
arbitral tribunal to which the dispute was being submitted under Annex VII
of the UNCLOS, Australia announced its intention to seek prescription of
provisional measures by the relevant judicial bodies in accordance with
Article 290, paragraph 5, of the UNCLOS, with the major aim of forcing
70
Japan to immediately stop its unilateral EFP.
On July 15, 1999, Australia and New Zealand separately informed
Japan of the decision to submit a request to the relevant courts or
tribunals to prescribe provisional measures. On July 30, 1999, Australia
and New Zealand on the basis of regulations of Article 290(5) of the
UNCLOS, separately made formal requests for ITLOS to prescribe
provisional measures. The requests of Australia and New Zealand were
70.

See id.

assigned numbers and became tribunal judgment cases number three and
number four. On August 16, 1999, ITLOS pronounced that the case
submitted by Australia and the case submitted by New Zealand were
merged into one. Lastly on August 27, 1999, ITLOS determined, after
concluding that the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal would have primafacie
jurisdiction to hear the dispute over the conservation and management
measures of SBT between Australia, New Zealand and Japan, that it had
jurisdiction with respect to the request for provisional measures. Thus
ITLOS rendered an order prescribing certain provisional measures,
including that Japan must cease its unilateral EFP.
Regarding the judicial proceeding of Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal in
the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), it was
on August 31, 1998 when Australia and New Zealand separately delivered
diplomatic notes to Japan formally informing Japan of the existence of a
dispute between them regarding the conservation and management of
SBT. Because when Australia, New Zealand and Japan signed or ratified
the UNCLOS they had not made a declaration according to Article
287(1) choosing the method of dispute settlement, under Article 287(3)
of the UNCLOS, they "shall be deemed to have accepted arbitration in
accordance with Annex VII." Thus on July 15, 1999, Australia and New
Zealand delivered their statements to Japan, requesting to proceed to
arbitration in accordance with the Annex VII of the 1982 UNCLOS 1
Not long after ITLOS rendered its order on the Southern Bluefin Tuna
Case (provisional measures) in August 1999, the following five
arbitrators were appointed according to Article 3 of the Annex VII of the
UNCLOS: Justice Sir Kenneth Keith KBE of the Court of Appeal of
New Zealand (appointed by Australia and New Zealand), Ambassador
Chusei Yamada (the Chairman of the International Law Commission
and appointed by Japan), Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, the former ICJ
President (United States, appointed as neutral arbitrator), Judge Florentino
Feliciano of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organzation (Philippines,
appointed as neutral arbitrator), and Judge Per Tresselt of the European
Free Trade Association Court (Norway, appointed as neutral arbitrator 2
The "Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal" was composed of these five arbitrators.
The award rendered by the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal in the Southern
Bluefin Tuna Case (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) marked the first
instance of the application of compulsory arbitration under Part XV,
Section 2, of the UNCLOS since the entry into force of the Convention
71. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 287, para. 3 ("A State Party, which is a party to a
dispute not covered by a declaration in force, shall be deemed to have accepted
arbitration in accordance with Annex VII.").
72. Kwiatkowska, supra note 66, at 247.
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and as such is very significant.73 On August 4, 2000, the Annex VII
Arbitral Tribunal declined to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute in the
Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), and at the
same time, revoked the prescription of provisional measures ordered by
ITLOS on August 27, 1999.
B. Opposing Arguments Related to the Jurisdictionin the Southern
Bluefin Tuna Case and the FinalRuling of the Tribunals
During the proceedings of the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Provisional
Measures), Japan argued that ITLOS did not have jurisdiction in this
case; Australia and New Zealand held a different viewpoint. On July 15,
1999, New Zealand and Australia sent statements to Japan, expressing
their intent to send the following matters for judgment to the Arbitral
Tribunal established under the Annex VII of the UNCLOS: (1) Japan
had breached its obligations under Article 64 and Articles 116 to 119 of
the UNCLOS in relation to the conservation and management of the
SBT stocks, including (a) Japan's failing to adopt necessary conservation
measures for its nationals fishing on the high seas so as to maintain or
restore the SBT stock to levels which can produce the maximum sustainable
yield, as required by Article 119 and contrary to the obligation under
Article 117 to take necessary conservation measures for its nationals; (b)
Japan's carrying out the unilateral EFP in 1998 and 1999 which resulted
in SBT being taken by Japan over and above the previously agreed
CCSBT national catch allocations; (c) the action of Japan's taking
unilateral experimental fishing encroached upon the rights and interests
of Australia and New Zealand that are recognized under Article 116(b)
of the UNCLOS; and Japan's allowing its nationals to catch additional
SBT in the course of experimental fishing in a way which created a
result of discrimination against the fishermen of Australia and New
Zealand in accordance with Article 119 (3) of the UNCLOS; (d) Japan's
failing in good faith to co-operate with Australia and New Zealand with
a view to ensuring the conservation of SBT, as required by Article 64 of
the 1982 UNCLOS; and Japan's failing in its obligations under the
UNCLOS to take precautionary measures in respect of the conservation
and management of SBT; 74 (2) As a consequence of the aforesaid
73. Id. at 241.
74. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases,
supra note 62, at 1627.

breaches of the UNCLOS, Japan should: (a) refrain from authorising or
conducting any further experimental fishing for SBT without the
agreement of New Zealand and Australia; (b) negotiate and co-operate in
good faith with New Zealand and Australia, including through the
Commission, with a view to agreeing to future conservation measures
and TAC for SBT necessary for maintaining and restoring the SBT stock
to levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield; (c) ensure
that its nationals and persons subject to its jurisdiction do not take any
SBT which would lead to a total annual catch of SBT above the amount
of the previous national allocations agreed with New Zealand and
Australia until such time as agreement is reached with New Zealand and
Australia on an alternative SBT catch level; and (d) restrict its catch in
any given fishing year to its national allocation as last agreed in the
Commission subject to the reduction of such catch by the amount of
SBT taken by Japan in the course of its unilateral experimental fishing in
1998 and 1999; and (3) Japan pays New Zealand's costs of proceedings.
In addition, prior to the establishment of the Annex VII Arbitral
Tribunal, Australia and New Zealand requested that Japan: (1) agree to
certain provisional measures with respect to the disputes over the
conservation and management of SBT stocks; and (2) agree to submit
the question in relation to the said provisional measures to ITLOS. If
Japan did not so agree within two weeks, immediately on the expiry of
the two-week period and without further notice, Australia and New
Zealand would reserve the right to request ITLOS to prescribe the
provisional measures that included the following: (1) Japan immediately
ceases unilateral experimental fishing for SBT; (2) Japan restricts its
catch in any given fishing year to its national allocation as last agreed in
the Commission, subject to the reduction of such catch by the amount of
SBT taken by Japan in the course of its unilateral experimental fishing in
1998 and 1999; (3) the parties act consistently with the precautionary
principle in fishing for SBT pending a final settlement of the dispute; (4)
the parties ensure that no action of any kind is taken which might
aggravate, extend or make it more difficult for solution of the dispute
that is submitted to the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal; and (5) the parties
ensure that no action is taken which might prejudice their respective
rights in respect of the carrying out of any decision on the merits that the
76
Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal may render.
On July 30, 1999, Japan replied to ITLOS, asking that the request of
Australia and New Zealand for the prescription of provisional measures
should be denied. On August 20 of that same year, Japan presented its
75.
76.

Id. at 1628.
Id. at 1629.
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final submission. The basis of Japan's argument included the following
counterclaims: Disputes arising over the conservation and management
of SBT mainly involve the relevant regulations of the SBT Convention,
thus the resolution of disputes should be in accordance with the dispute
settlement procedures provided in Article 16 of this Convention; disputes
related to the conservation and management of SBT do not involve legal
principles, but disputable scientific issues; Australia and New Zealand
should continue consulting with Japan in accordance with Part XV,
Section 1, of the UNCLOS, and the principle of good faith; as New
Zealand and Australia ceased dialogue with Japan, they have not yet
satisfied the regulations of Part XV of the UNCLOS binding them to
compulsory dispute settlement procedures; SBT is not threatened by
unredeemable losses; Article 64 of the UNCLOS stipulates the obligation
of cooperation, but does not set definite conservation principles or
concrete conservation measures; and finally, it is doubtful whether the
precautionary principle has obtained legal status as a rule under
customary international law. Therefore, the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal
does not have prima facie jurisdiction over the SBT conservation and
management disputes between Australia, New Zealand and Japan. If the
Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction, ITLOS, as Japan
argued, therefore has no right to prescribe provisional measures in
accordance with Article 290, paragraph 5 of the UNCLOS. However if
ITLOS determines that in this case it still has jurisdiction, then, in
accordance with the ITLOS Rules of the Tribunal Article 89(5), 7 7 Japan
requested the Tribunal grant Japan provisional relief in the form of
prescribing that Australia and New Zealand urgently and in good faith
recommence negotiations with Japan for a period of six months to reach
a consensus on the outstanding issues between them, including a
protocol for a continued EFP and the determination of a TAC and
national allocations for the year 2000. Should Japan, Australia, and New
Zealand not reach a consensus within six months following the resumption
of these negotiations, the Tribunal should prescribe that any remaining
disagreements would
be referred to the panel of independent scientists
78
for their resolution.
77. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Rules of the Tribunal, supra note
50, art. 89(5) ("When a request for provisional measures has been made, the Tribunal
may prescribe measures different in whole or in part from those requested and indicate
the parties which are to take or to comply with each measure.").
78. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases,

In August 1999, ITLOS carried out preliminary deliberations, giving
the following reasons in support of its judgment that it has jurisdiction
over the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Provisional Measures): the
differences between Australia, New Zealand and Japan with regard to
SBT conservation and management measures also concern points of law;
under Article 64, read together with Articles 116 to 119, of the UNCLOS,
States Parties to this Convention have the duty to cooperate directly or
through appropriate international organizations with a view to ensuring
conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilization of
highly migratory species (thunnus maccoyii); SBT is listed in Annex I of
the UNCLOS; the conduct of the parties within the CCSBT established
in accordance with the SBT Convention, and in their relations with nonparties to that Convention, is relevant to an evaluation of the extent to
which the parties are in compliance with their obligations under the
UNCLOS; in the view of ITLOS, the provisions of the UNCLOS invoked
by Australia and New Zealand appear to afford a basis on which the
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal might be founded; in the view of ITLOS,
the fact that the SBT Convention applies between the parties does not
preclude recourse to the procedures in Part XV, section 2, of the UNCLOS;
that negotiations and consultations have taken place between the parties
and that the records show that these negotiations were considered by
Australia and New Zealand as being under the SBT Convention and also
under the UNCLOS; in the view of the Tribunal, a State Party is not
obliged to pursue procedures under Part XV, section 1, of the UNCLOS
when it concludes that the possibilities of settlement have been exhausted;
in the view of the Tribunal, the requirements for invoking the procedures
under Part XV, section 2, of the UNCLOS have been fulfilled; for the
above reasons, ITLOS found that the Annex VII
79 Arbitral Tribunal would
primafaciehave jurisdiction over the disputes.
Article 290, paragraph 5, of the UNCLOS provides that
[p]ending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal to which a dispute is being
submitted under this section, any court or tribunal agreed upon by the parties or,
failing such agreement within two weeks from the date of the request for
provisional measures, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea... may
prescribe, modify or revoke provisional measures in accordance with this article
if it considers that primafacie the tribunal which is to be constituted would have
jurisdiction and that the urgency of the situation so requires. Once constituted,
the tribunal to which the dispute has been submitted may modify, revoke or

affirm those provisional measures, acting in conformity with paragraphs 1 to 4.

Because ITLOS in its preliminary deliberations had already ruled that
the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal had jurisdiction over the disputes
supra note 62, at 1631.
79. Id. at 1631-33.
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related to the conservation and management of SBT between Australia,
New Zealand and Japan, if ITLOS wants to proscribe provisional measures
it must be as "the urgency of the situation so requires." Japan argued that
SBT is not threatened by unredeemable losses, thus the urgency of the
situation required for the proscription of temporary measures does not
exist. However, ITLOS held that the conservation of the marine living
resources is an element in the protection and preservation of the marine
environment; that there is no disagreement between the parties that the
stock of SBT is severely depleted and is at its historically lowest levels
and that this is a cause for serious biological concern; that there is
scientific uncertainty regarding measures to be taken to conserve the
stock of SBT and that there is no agreement among the parties as to
whether the conservation measures taken so far have led to the
improvement in the stock of SBT; that the parties should intensify their
efforts to cooperate with other participants in the fishery for SBT with a
view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of optimum
utilization of the stock; that, although the Tribunal cannot conclusively
assess the scientific evidence presented by the parties, it finds that
measures should be taken as a matter of urgency to preserve the rights of
the parties and to avert further deterioration of the SBT stock; that in the
view of the Tribunal, catches taken within the framework of any
experimental fishing program should not result in total catches which
exceed the levels last set by the parties for each of them, except under
agreed criteria; and that "Japan made a clear commitment that the 1999
experimental fishing program will end." ITLOS therefore ruled that it
80
is appropriate to prescribe provisional measures under the circumstances.
Accordingly, ITLOS prescribed the following six provisional measures:
1) Australia, Japan and New Zealand shall each ensure that no
action is taken which might aggravate or extend the disputes
submitted to the arbitral tribunal;
2) Australia, Japan and New Zealand shall each ensure that no
action is taken which might prejudice the carrying out of any
decision on the merits which the arbitral tribunal may render;
3) Australia, Japan and New Zealand shall ensure, unless they
agree otherwise that their annual catches do not exceed the
annual national allocations at the levels last agreed by the

80.

Id. at 1633-35.

parties of 5,265 tonnes, 6,065 tonnes and 420 tonnes,
respectively; in calculating the annual catches for 1999 and
2000, and without prejudice to any decision of the arbitral
tribunal, account shall be taken of the catch during 1999 as
part of an experimental fishing programme;
4) Australia, Japan and New Zealand shall each refrain from
conducting an experimental fishing programme involving
the taking of a catch of southern bluefin tuna, except with
the agreement of the other parties or unless the experimental
catch is counted against its annual national allocation as
prescribed in subparagraph (c);
5) Australia, Japan and New Zealand should resume negotiations
without delay with a view to reaching agreement on measures
for the conservation and management of southern bluefin
tuna;
6) Australia, Japan and New Zealand should make further
efforts to reach agreement with other States and fishing
entities engaged in fishing for southern bluefin tuna, with a
view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective
of optimum utilization of the stock. 8 1
As to whether the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal has jurisdiction over
disputes related to SBT conservation and management, Japan believes
that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction over the substantial issues of the
disputes. The reasons put forward by Japan are explained as follows:
First, the dispute necessarily is one concerning the interpretation and
application of the SBT Convention and not a dispute over the interpretation
or application of the UNCLOS. Under both the customary international
law and the 1982 UNCLOS, Japan or any other states are not obligated
to reach an agreement with the parties to the SBT Convention prior to
the carrying out of the SBT experimental fishing program. As pointed
out by Japan, the dispute between Japan and Australia and New Zealand
arising from the implementation of the SBT conservation and management
measures and the consultations or negotiations between them for the
purpose of settling the dispute were carried out within the framework
established under the SBT Convention. The main purpose for Australia
and New Zealand to invoke the UNCLOS and the relevant customary
81. Id. at 1635-36 (stating the 21 Judges of ITLOS added a temporary appointment
judge making 22 judges in total and the voting situation on the stipulation of provisional
measures is as follows: The first provisional measure: 20 votes to 2; The second
provisional measure; 20 votes to 2; the third provisional measure: 18 to 4; the fourth
provisional measure: 20 votes to 2; the fifth provisional measure; 21 votes to 1; the sixth
provisional measure: 20 votes to 2).
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international law is to request ITLOS to prescribe provisional measures,
which is an artifice of Australia and New Zealand to evade the
application of the dispute settlement procedure provided in Article 16 of
the SBT Convention. Second, while New Zealand, Australia, and Japan
had signed the SBT Convention in May 1993, which then entered into
force in May 1994, they ratified the UNCLOS in 1996. Before their
ratification of the UNCLOS, these three countries had been bound by the
SBT Convention for a period of some 26 months. Therefore, the governing
treaty in respect of the settlement of the dispute arising from the conservation
and management of SBT is not 1982 UNCLOS but the SBT Convention. 2
Third, while the UNCLOS is a multilateral international treaty and is
regarded as a framework or umbrella convention and was adopted earlier
than the SBT Convention, and the SBT Convention can be considered an
implementing agreement of the UNCLOS, Japan argues that based on
the principles of the lex posteriorand the lex specialis, Article 16 of the
SBT Convention should be the provision to be applied to resolve the
issue of jurisdiction excised by the Tribunal. Fourth, Japan pointed out
that the major reason for Australia and New Zealand not to bring suit
against Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia in accordance with the relevant
provisions contained in the UNCLOS for their failure to take actions to
conserve and manage the SBT was because they are not contracting
parties to the SBT Convention. It therefore demonstrates that the SBT
Convention should be treated as an effective treaty that bound Australia,
New Zealand, and Japan in the settlement of their dispute over the
conservation and management of SBT. Fifth, Japan further pointed out
that the regulations provided in Article 311 of the UNCLOS, concerning
this Convention's relation to other conventions and international agreements,
is also consistent with Japan's analysis, namely the UNCLOS should not
alter the rights and obligations of State Parties which arise from other
agreements compatible with the UNCLOS, namely the SBT Convention.
Since the provisions provided in the SBT Convention are compatible
with Article 64 of the UNCLOS, Japan argued that its right under the
SBT Convention should not be altered. Even though disputes related to
the conservation and management of SBT really involve the interpretation
and application of the UNCLOS (Japan opposed this viewpoint),
according to Article 280 of the UNCLOS, "[n]othing in this Part impairs

82.
1376.

UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal: Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, supra note 63, at

the right of any States Parties to agree at any time to settle a dispute
between them concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention
by any peaceful means of their own choice." The parties to the Southern
Bluefin Tuna case can adopt the procedures for dispute settlement
methods pursuant to Article 16 of the SBT Convention. In addition,
parties to a dispute can at any time before or after the dispute arises
choose the means of dispute settlement.83
Sixth, Japan claims that during the proceedings, if its disputes with
Australia and New Zealand truly arise from the interpretation and
application of both the SBT Convention and the UNCLOS, then Article
16 of the SBT Convention, arguendo, should be considered consistent
with Article 281, paragraph 1, of the 1982 UNCLOS, which provides
that "[i]f the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention have agreed to seek
settlement of the dispute by a peaceful means of their own choice, the
procedures provided for in this Part apply only where no settlement has
been reached by recourse to such means and the agreement between the
parties does not exclude any further procedure." Thus, in accordance
with Article 16(2) of the SBT Convention, no dispute should be referred
to the ICJ or to arbitration without their consent.8 Seventh, Japan cites a
very large number of treaties that relate to the law of the sea, such as the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, that have
dispute settlement provisions but have no compulsory settlement. The
reason for these treaties not including the provisions of compulsory
dispute settlement is their intention to avoid the application of Part XV,
Section 2, of the UNCLOS concerning compulsory adjudication or
arbitration. If the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal would determine that Part
XV of the UNCLOS should be first applied before the application of the
SBT Convention, the dispute settlement provisions contained in a large
number of international treaties that relate to matters embraced by the
UNCLOS would be profoundly disturbed.85
Eighth, while Australia and New Zealand argue that the UNCLOS
establishes a "new and comprehensive legal regime for all ocean space"
and a vital element of which is "mandatory" settlement of dispute, Japan
83. Id. at 1377.
84. SBT Convention, supra note 5, art. 16, para. 2 states:
Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall, with the consent in each
case of all parties to the dispute, be referred for settlement to the International
Court of Justice or to arbitration; but failure to reach agreement on reference to
the International Court of Justice or to arbitration shall not absolve parties to
the dispute from the responsibility of continuing to seek to resolve it by any of
the various peaceful means referred to in paragraph 1 above.
85. UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal: Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, supra note 63, at
1376-77.
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points out that in fact the peaceful settlement provisions of the UNCLOS
are flexible and are designed to allow parties to a dispute to choose their
own means of peaceful settlement. Japan further argues, even if the
Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal indeed considers the dispute over the
conservation and management of SBT relevant to the interpretation and
application of the regulations provided for in the UNCLOS, it should
decline to pass upon the merits of the Southern Bluefin Tuna case,
mainly because both Australia and New Zealand had failed to meet the
conditions governing such recourse set out in the UNCLOS. As
mentioned earlier, Article 280 of the UNCLOS provides that "[n]othing
in this Part [Part XV] impairs the right of any States Parties to agree at
any time to settle a dispute between them concerning the interpretation
or application of this Convention by any peaceful means of their own
choice." The wording "at any time" written in this provision implies
that it embraces not only disputes that have already arisen but also
disputes that may arise. Under Article 16 of the SBT Convention, the
parties to the Southern Bluefin Tuna case had chosen the peaceful means
of dispute settlement listed therein, which do not include compulsory
arbitration pursuant to Part XV of the 1982 UNCLOS. Japan points out
that Australia and New Zealand had not exhausted the means of peaceful
dispute settlement, in particular, not accepting Japan's proposal for
mediation and arbitration under the SBT Convention. In addition, Japan
states that Australia and New Zealand failed to fulfill their obligations
under Article 16 of the SBT Convention to negotiate with Japan for the
resolution of the dispute. Moreover, as argued by Japan, conditions
should be attached to when a party to a dispute decides to apply Article
281 of the UNCLOS to resort to compulsory dispute settlement. That is,
the party to the dispute must reach an agreement with another party to
the dispute, agreeing that other procedures for dispute settlement are not
excluded. Japan believes that Article 16 of the SBT Convention excludes
other procedures for dispute settlement that are not agreed to by all of
the parties to the dispute. In other words, mainly because the parties to
the Southern Bluefin Tuna case had not reached any agreement to
submit the dispute to other procedure of dispute settlement, Part XV,
Section 2 of the UNCLOS concerning compulsory dispute settlement
cannot be applied.86

86.

Id. at 1377-78.

Ninth, Japan argued that under Article 282 of the UNCLOS, which
provides that: "[i]f the States Parties which are parties to a dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention have
agreed, through a general, regional or bilateral agreement or otherwise,
that such dispute shall, at the request of any party to the dispute, be
submitted to a procedure that entails a binding decision, that procedure
shall apply in lieu of the procedures provided for in this Part, unless the
parties to the dispute otherwise agree," Australia and New Zealand
should have submitted their dispute to the ICJ for settlement that entails
a binding decision. But these two countries failed to do so, which is
considered a violation of the obligation under Article 282. Even if the
dispute were submitted to the ICJ by Australia and New Zealand, Japan
would have opposed the jurisdiction of the Court over the case, on the
grounds of reservation to the Optional Clause of the ICJ Statute. In
addition, Australia and New Zealand also failed to proceed to negotiation
with Japan for the resolution of the dispute in accordance with Article
283 of the UNCLOS. 8 7 Lastly, Japan holds that the Annex VII Tribunal
should not rule over the Southern Bluefin Tuna case based on the following
three arguments: (1) The SBT dispute is a scientific, not a legal issue; (2)
Australia and New Zealand's vague and elusive reference to articles of
the UNCLOS is insufficient and difficult to be understood; and there is a
failure to identify a cause of action; (3) Japan has already accepted a
catch limit proposed by Australia for its EFP of 1,500 mt, reduced from
1,800 mt, and thus the dispute is moot.88
On the contrary to Japan's arguments, both the arguments of Australia
and New Zealand are in support of the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal's
jurisdiction over the dispute concerning the conservation and management
of SBT stocks, which include the following contentions: (1) that ITLOS
was unanimous in its finding that this Tribunal has primafacie jurisdiction;
(2) the UNCLOS established a new and comprehensive legal regime for
all ocean space; the importance of the obligations it contains were such
"that their acceptance was seen as critically dependent upon the
establishment of an effective, binding and compulsory system for resolving
all disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention
as a whole"; the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal should sustain the
effectiveness and comprehensive character of the dispute settlement
regime established by the UNCLO; (3) Japan has not only failed to take
the necessary action to conserve the SBT stock, but also endangered that
stock by an experimental fishing program that was unilateral, contained
a high component of commercial fishing and did not comply with agreed
87.

Id. at 1379.

88.

Id.
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guidelines for experimental fishing; the dispute is about the primacy of
conservation over exploitation of a seriously depleted stock; Japan is
exploiting the SBT stock with unnecessary risk and is thereby in breach
of its obligations under Articles 64 and 116-119 of the UNCLOS.
Accordingly, it is clear that the dispute is related to the interpretation and
application of the UNCLOS. In addition, Australia and New Zealand, in
rejecting Japan's Preliminary Objections, made the following final
submissions: that the Parties differ on the question whether Japan's EFP
and associated conduct is governed by the UNCLOS; that a dispute thus
exists about the interpretation and application of the UNCLOS within
the meaning of Part XV; that all the jurisdictional requirements of that
Part have been satisfied; and that Japan's objections to the admissibility
of the dispute are unfounded.89
In the view of the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal, the case is not moot
because of the following reasoning. First, while Japan is willing to
reduce its EFP catch from 1,800 tons to 1,500 tons, it does not resolve
the dispute with Australia and New Zealand over the SBT conservation
and management measures, given the fact that Australia and New Zealand
have made it clear that they do not accept the catch limitation offered by
Japan. Second, the dispute concerns both the quality and quantity of the
EFP and other differences of element. 90 The Tribunal believes that the
core of the dispute relates to differences about the level of a TAC and to
Japan's insistence on conducting, and its conduct of, a unilateral
experimental fishing program. What profoundly divides the Parties is
whether the dispute arises from the interpretation and application of the
SBT Convention or from the relevant provisions of the UNCLOS. The
Tribunal points out that it is clear that the most acute elements of the
dispute between the Parties turn on their inability to agree on a revised
TAC, the related conduct by Japan of unilateral experimental fishing in
1998 and 1999, and Japan's announced plans for such fishing to be
continued thereafter. Those elements of the dispute were clearly within
the mandate of the CCSBT. It was there that the Parties failed to agree
on a TAC. It was there that Japan announced in 1998 that it would
launch a unilateral experimental fishing program. It was there that the
Japanese EFP announcement was protested by Australia and New
Zealand. It was also within the framework of CCSBT where the higher

89.
90.

Id. at 1385.
Id. at 1386.

level of diplomatic exchanges and consultations were taken place. What
should be noted is the fact that there are no disagreements between
Australia, New Zealand, and Japan over whether the dispute falls within
the provisions of the SBT Convention. The real difference between them
is whether the dispute also falls within the provisions of the UNCLOS.
As mentioned earlier, Australia and New Zealand contend that Japan's
unilateral EFP has placed it in breach of its obligations under Articles
64, and Articles 116-119 of the UNCLOS. They argue that Japan under
both the SBT Convention and the UNCLOS as well as customary
international law is obligated to take actions to conserve the SBT stocks.
But Japan argued in its counter-claims that the main reason for Australia
and New Zealand to resort to the provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS is to
achieve their goal of requesting ITLOS to prescribe provisional measures.
In addition, the provisions cited by Australia and New Zealand are
considered general regulations, which cannot bind the parties to the
dispute over the SBT conservation and management. However, the
Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal rejected Japan's arguments, indicating that
it is a commonplace of international law and state practices for more
than one treaty to bear upon a particular dispute. There is no reason why
a given act of a State may not violate its obligations under more than one
treaty. There is frequently a parallelism of treaties, both in their substantive
content and in their provisions for settlement of disputes. For example,
the international cooperative obligation in protecting and observing
human rights under Articles 1, 55, and 56 of the Charter of the United
Nations will not be discharged for UN member states by their signing
and ratification of other human rights-related international treaties. The
Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal therefore concluded that the dispute
between Australia and New Zealand, on the one hand, and Japan on the
other, over Japan's role in the management of SBT stocks and particularly
its unilateral experimental fishing program, while centered in the SBT
Convention, also arises under the UNCLOS. In its view, this conclusion
is consistent with the regulations provided in Article 311(2) and (5) of
the UNCLOS, and with the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, in particular, Article 30, paragraph 3. 91
The Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal turns to the question regarding
whether the dispute settlement procedure provided in Part XV of the
UNCLOS can be applied to the case without the consent of the parties to
the dispute. It is the view of the Tribunal that Article 16 of the SBT
Convention is not a peaceful means of dispute settlement but provides a
list of different methods for dispute settlement and at the same time adds

91.

Id. at 1388.
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the wording of "other peaceful means of their own choice." However,
the Tribunal points out that Article 16 of the SBT Convention is indeed
one of the "peaceful means of their own choice" contained in Article
281, paragraph 1, and Article 281 of the UNCLOS. Accordingly, the
conditions for the application of Article 281 have been fulfilled. In
addition, as far as the objective of Article 281, paragraph 1, and Article
281 of the 1982 UNCLOS are concerned, Article 16, paragraph 2, of the
SBT Convention does not require the parties to the dispute to negotiate
with the parties on the other side indefinitely. It is the right of the parties
to the dispute to conclude that no settlement has been reached.92
Lastly, it is the view of the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal that according
to the text of Article 16, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the SBT Convention, the
application of the compulsory dispute settlement is indeed excluded.
Based on this view, the Tribunal concluded that Article 16 of the SBT
Convention "exclude[s] any further procedure" within the contemplation
of Article 281 (1) of the UNCLOS. In addition, the Tribunal, by referring
to the regulations provided for in Part XV, Section 3, of the UNCLOS,
explained that the application of Part XV, Section 2 (Compulsory
Procedures Entailing Binding Decisions) is not without limitation. This
finding is also used in support of the Tribunal's conclusion as stated
above. The Tribunal points out that under Article 297 of the UNCLOS,
the disputes, such as those concerning the right to navigation, overflight,
and laying submarine cables or pipelines in a coastal state's Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ), and the disputes concerning the preservation and
protection of the marine environment are excluded from the application
of the compulsory dispute settlement procedure as provided in Part XV,
Section 2, of the UNCLOS. The Tribunal also points out the fact that
...a significant number of international agreements with maritime elements,
entered into after the adoption of UNCLOS, exclude with varying degrees of
explicitness unilateral reference of a dispute to compulsory adjudication or
arbitral procedures. Many of these agreements effect such exclusion by
expressly requiring disputes to be resolved by mutually agreed procedures,
whether by negotiation and consultation or other methods acceptable to the
parties to the dispute or by arbitration or recourse to the International
Court of
93
Justice by common agreement of the parties to the dispute.

Without such exclusion, the right of the parties to a dispute to select their
own means of dispute settlement in accordance with the dispute settlement

92.

Id. at 1389.

93.

Id. at 1391.

procedure provided in the implementing agreements of the UNCLOS
would be substantially deprived. Based upon the aforementioned analysis,
the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal concluded that it lacks jurisdiction to
entertain the merits of the dispute concerning the conservation and
management of SBT stocks, brought by Australia and New Zealand
against Japan. Having reached this conclusion, the Tribunal does not
find it necessary to pass upon questions of the admissibility of the
dispute. 94
VII. IS IT POSSIBLE FOR TAIWAN AND OTHER CCSBT MEMBERS
TO SEND DISPUTES TO ITLOS FOR JUDGMENT?
DOES THE TRIBUNAL HAVE JURISDICTION?

A. Fishery ForeignRelations Between Taiwan
and Other CCSBT Members
Taiwan and CCSBT members Japan, Australia, New Zealand and
South Korea and CCSBT cooperating non-member Philippines have no
formal diplomatic ties. However, in February 1999, Taiwan signed an
Action Plan with Japan, and in April 2003 signed another related followup Action Plan for the purpose of proceeding to cooperation in handling
the following matters: the buy-back and decommission of the used tuna
longline fishing vessel sold by the Japanese companies to Taiwan's
fishing companies or nationals, the re-registration of the Flag of
Convenience (FOC) fishing vessels owned and operated by Taiwanese
nationals, the management of the large-scale long-line fishing vessels,
and the deterrence of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing
activities. In addition, as noted previously, in April 2001, at the 7th
Annual Meeting of the CCSBT, the Resolution to Establish an Extended
Commission and An Extended Scientific Committee was adopted. On
December 28, 2001, CCSBT Executive Secretary, Brian Macdonald,
according to this Resolution, invited Taiwan as "the Fishing Entity of
Taiwan" to apply to become a member of the Extended Commission. On
August 30, 2002, Taiwan formally became a member of the CCSBT
Extended Commission and Extended Scientific Committee. Afterwards,
Taiwan participated in the CCSBT activities related to the conservation
and management of SBT, and Taiwan's rights and obligations arising
from the membership of this fisheries management organization are
bound by the SBT Convention, the April 2001 CCSBT Resolution, other
resolutions adopted or decisions made by the Commission, which include
the national quotas of the yearly-decided TAC for SBT, the adoption and
94.
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implementation of the SBT conservation and management measures, and
the dispute settlement procedure. The interactions between Taiwan and
other CCSBT members with regard to conservation and management of
SBT in accordance with the SBT Convention are also governed by these
documents.
B. Relevant Treaties,Agreements, Arrangements,Diplomatic
Notes, or Other Principles Under InternationalLaw
That Bind Taiwan and Other CCSBT Members
As far as the fisheries resources conservation and management
measures in the EEZ and high seas are concerned, Taiwan and other
CCSBT members, based either on treaty obligation or voluntarily
obedience, should be bound by the relevant international (treaty and
customary) law, including the UN General Assembly Resolution 46-215
adopted in December 1991, 95 and other fisheries related international

declarations, treaties, conventions or action plans, in particular the
UNCLOS, the 1992 Agenda 21, the 1992 Cancun Declaration, the
HSCA, the 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing, the UNFSA,
and the Action Plans passed by the Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations related to management of fishing capacity,
incidental catch of sea birds by long-line fishing vessels, and the Illegal,
Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing. At the same time, Taiwan
and other CCSBT members also have obligations to respect the resolutions
adopted or decisions made by the international or regional fisheries
management organizations to which they belong.
The five members of CCSBT (Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South
Korea and Taiwan), apart from Taiwan, are all parties to the UNCLOS
and the SBT Convention; Japan, Australia and New Zealand are parties
to the UNFSA; Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan are
parties to the HSCA. On the basis of the 2001 Exchange of Letters with
the CCSBT, Taiwan is indirectly bound by the provisions provided in
the SBT Convention. After Taiwan became a member to the CCSBT
Extended Commission, there arose the possibility of disputes between
95. Ocean Law, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/215: Large Scale
Pelagic Drift-Net Fishing and Its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World's
Oceans and Seas, http://www.oceanlaw.net/texts/ga46_215.htm (stating this resolution
requests all nations from the end of 1992 to stop large-scale pelagic drift-net fishing in
the open ocean. Large scale drift-net fishing and its impact on the living marine resources of
the world's oceans and seas).

Taiwan and other CCSBT members, arising from conflicting interpretation
or application of the related international treaties, arrangements, diplomatic
Exchange of Notes, etc. Once a dispute occurs, Taiwan and the parties to
the dispute are required to follow the dispute settlement procedures that
are provided in the related treaties, resolutions, or diplomatic exchange
of notes.
According to paragraph 2 of the April 2001 CCSBT Resolution, once
any dispute arises between Taiwan and other CCSBT members concerning
the interpretation or application of this Resolution, including the
provisions of the SBT Convention explicitly specified in the Resolution,
or the Exchange of Letters referred to in paragraph 6 of the April 2001
CCSBT Resolution, should be resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration or other peaceful means agreed by the parties to
the dispute. 96 While paragraph 2 of the April 2001 CCSBT Resolution,
as previously mentioned, excludes judicial settlement as a means of
dispute settlement, can it be argued that the inclusion of the text of "or
other peaceful means agreed by the parties to the dispute" in this
Resolution be interpreted as including ITLOS? There are scholars who
believe that the wording "or other peaceful means agreed by the parties
to the dispute" in the April 2001 CCSBT Resolution can be interpreted
as including ITLOS.97 Due to the fact that, the text of paragraph 2 of the
April 2001 CCSBT Resolution includes the method of arbitration by
independent third parties as one means of dispute settlement, it should
therefore be reasonably interpreted that judicial settlement is also
included as one of the means of dispute settlement.9 However, to help
clarify the real intention of the CCSBT that members not include the
wording "judicial settlement" in the text of paragraph 2 of the
Resolution, it might be useful to examine the records of the discussions
and negotiations at the annual meeting of the CCSBT held in April 2001,
provided that these records are available.
It is this writer's opinion that the intention to take the wording "judicial
settlement" from the text of Paragraph 2 of the April 2001 Resolution
was probably to avoid the difficulty of dealing with the sensitive issues
concerning Taiwan's international legal status, diplomatic recognition of
Taiwan, or the possibility of Taiwan's appealing to ICJ or other tribunals
when a dispute arises between Taiwan and other CCSBT member states,
which must be resolved in accordance with the dispute settlement procedure

96. April 2001 CCSBT Resolution, supranote 7, para. 2.
97. Letters between Ted L. McDorman, School of Law, University of Victoria,
Canada and Editor-in-Chief of Ocean Development & International Law: The Journal of
Marine Affairs and the author (on file with the author).
98. Id.
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provided in Paragraph 2 of the April 2001 CCSBT Resolution. This
speculation is problematic, however, because Taiwan is not a member of
the United Nations and cannot submit a dispute to the ICJ for judicial
settlement. In addition, ITLOS does not exclude ruling over a dispute
involving "entities other than States Parties." Of the three founding
members of the CCSBT, Japan possibly has a stronger preference to
avoid dealing with the issue concerning Taiwan's international legal
standing or to consider sensitive issues such as diplomatic recognition
during the proceedings of dispute settlement involving Taiwan. As for
Australia and New Zealand, it is not clear what kind of position they
took when the April 2001 CCSBT Resolution was drafted, discussed,
and then adopted. Unlike these two countries, when the CCSBT adopted
the Resolution, Japan made a special declaration, stating that the
Exchange of Letters specified in the text of paragraph 6 the Resolution
was not the same as diplomatic documents. 99 Australia and New Zealand
did not make similar declarations. Once a CCSBT member, such as Japan,
believes that the text of Paragraph 2 of the April 2001 CCSBT
Resolution related to dispute settlement resolution does not include
judicial settlement, and another CCSBT member (such as New Zealand)
or an Extended Commission member (such as Taiwan) takes the view
that the wording "or other peaceful means agreed by the parties to the
dispute" in the Resolution also includes submitting the dispute to ITLOS
for settlement, the two parties must again return to basic procedures for
dispute resolution. In addition, it is worth mentioning that Paragraph 2
of the Resolution to Establish an Extended Commission and Extended
Scientific Committee clearly stipulates that arbitration is one of the
peaceful means of dispute settlement to be used in disputes between
Taiwan and CCSBT members when a dispute between them occurs over
the interpretation and application of the April 2001 CCSBT Resolution
and the relevant provisions of the SBT Convention. In any case,
comparing the selection of the method of arbitration with the choice of
submitting the dispute to ITLOS for judgment, the possibility for China
to request to intervene in a case submitted to ITLOS by Taiwan and
another party to a dispute is much bigger than the selection of the
method of arbitration, in which the third party (China) is unable to
intervene.

99. See Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, Report of the
Seventh Annual Meeting of the Commission, supra note 31.

C. The Possibilityof Referring Disputes to ITLOSfor Judgment
and the Issue of Whether ITLOS has Jurisdiction
The legal disputes between Taiwan and other CCSBT member states
that might arise from the arguments over the following matters: the SBT
conservation and management measures in accordance with the SBT
Convention, Taiwan's right to participate in the operation and decisionmaking process of the CCSBT, and Taiwan's right in those scientific or
technical working groups or subsidiary bodies established under the
Commission. For example, after the CCSBT Extended Commission made a
decision, the CCSBT adopted another new resolution overturning or
making substantial revisions to the decision made previously by the
CCSBT Extended Commission. Another example is that the CCSBT
adopted a resolution that revised the yearly TAC of SBT, which increased
the amount of TAC. However, when distributing national quotas, all
CCSBT members except Taiwan increased their national quotas. Other
possible legal disputes include the issue of the legal standing of the 2001
Exchange of Letters between the CCSBT Executive Secretary and
Taiwan's Fisheries Administrator. Is this Exchange of Letters considered
"any other agreement" as specified in Article 20(2) and Article 21 of the
ITLOS Statute? Do CCSBT members have the obligation to refer any of
their disputes with Taiwan, which arise from the interpretation and
application of the SBT Convention, the April 2001 CCSBT Resolution,
and the December 2001 Exchange of Letters between Taiwan's Fisheries
Administrator and the CCSBT Executive Secretary, for arbitration? Or,
in accordance with the April 2001 CCSBT Resolution, can CCSBT
members sign a special agreement with Taiwan for disputes to be referred
to ITLOS for judgment?
As explained in Section III, if any dispute occurs between Taiwan and
CCSBT members that relates to the interpretation or application of the
SBT Convention, the April 2001 CCSBT Resolution, and the 2001
Exchange of Letters between Taiwan and the CCSBT Executive Secretary,
the main legal basis for dispute resolution is the text of paragraph 2 of
the April 2001 CCSBT Resolution, namely "[a]ny dispute concerning
the interpretation or implementation of this Resolution, including the
articles of the Convention specified in the Resolution, or Exchange of
Letters referred to in paragraph 6, shall be resolved by negotiation,
inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or other peaceful means
agreed by the parties to the dispute." Accordingly, for ITLOS to have
jurisdiction over disputes involving Taiwan and arising from the
interpretation and implementation of the SBT Convention, the following
conditions must be satisfied:
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1) If a dispute already exists, and there is no way for resolution
through negotiation or other peaceful means;
2) The dispute must be related to Taiwan's participation in
the CCSBT activities based on its rights and obligations
under the SBT Convention;
3) The interpretation of the Resolution adopted by the
CCSBT in April 2001 and the Exchange of Letters between
Taiwan and the CCSBT includes the choice of referring
the dispute to ITLOS for resolution;
4) A special agreement concluded between Taiwan and other
CCSBT member states, agreeing to refer their disputes to
ITLOS for judicial settlement.
Now, assuming that the CCSBT sets the TAC for SBT, according to an
independent scientific report and the proposal it submitted to the
Commission, at 17,930 mt in 2006-2007, including 7,065 mt allocated to
Japan, 6,265 mt allocated to Australia, 1,940 mt allocated to South
Korea, 1,140 mt allocated to Taiwan, and 620 mt allocated to New
Zealand. The remaining 900 mt would be allocated to cooperating nonmembers Philippines, Indonesia and South Africa. However the allocated
quota for these countries is inconsistent with the previous decision made
by the CCSBT Extended Commission, according to which, for the TAC
of 17,930 mt of SBT for 2006-2007, 6,965 mt is allocated to Japan,
6,165 mt is allocated to Australia, 1,640 mt is allocated to South Korea,
1,640 mt is given to Extended Commission Member Taiwan, 620 mt is
given to New Zealand. The remaining 900 mt is divided between
cooperating non-members Philippines, Indonesia and South Africa.
Because Taiwan believes that the allocated quota for CCSBT States
contravenes the April 2001 CCSBT Resolution, as well as principles of
justice, equality, and good faith that are specified in the Exchange of
Letters between the CCSBT Executive Secretary and Taiwan, and also
deprives of Taiwan's rights, it has gone through much negotiation but is
still unable to reach agreement over resuming previous decisions regarding
the national quota distribution for Extended Commission Members.
Therefore, Taiwan unilaterally declared that it decides to increase the
TAC of the 2006-2007 SBT from 1,140 mt to 1,640 mt and authorizes
its fishing boats to increase their catches. Afterwards, Taiwan requires
settlement of the dispute under paragraph 2 of the April 2001 CCSBT
Resolution.

When requesting to resolve the above hypothetical dispute with
CCSBT members, Taiwan might encounter the following situations:
1) CCSBT members agree with Taiwan's request to refer the
dispute for arbitration;
2) CCSBT members do not agree to refer the dispute for
arbitration;
3) CCSBT members agree with Taiwan's request for seeking
settlement of the dispute in accordance with the peaceful
means agreed to by the parties to the dispute; this includes
the means of judicial settlement; because Taiwan is not a
party to the ICJ Statute, and not a party to the 1982
UNCLOS, thus possible adoption of judicial resolution is
through ITLOS; this agreement must be embodied in a
special agreement signed by both Taiwan and CCSBT
members that are parties to the dispute;
4) CCSBT members do not agree to use the method of
judicial settlement.
When referring to the dispute for arbitration, it is possible to avoid a
third party intervention, and thus, when CCSBT members agree to
Taiwan's request to refer disputes for arbitration, it is more difficult for
China to intervene if it makes the request in the arbitration case.
However, if CCSBT members agree when Taiwan's request to refer the
dispute to ITLOS for settlement, it thus becomes more likely for the
issue of third party intervention to occur.
The following discussions will focus on the questions concerning
whether ITLOS has jurisdiction over the above-mentioned hypothetical
disputes and whether the Tribunal can prescribe provisional measures in
accordance with the relevant international legal regulations, the issue
related to the request for intervention from a third party in the proceedings,
and the issue of prompt release of vessels and crews.
1. CCSBT Members Agree with Taiwan's Request
to Refer Disputes to Arbitration
When a dispute occurs related to the above-mentioned arguments
between Taiwan and CCSBT members, both parties should settle their
disputes according to the methods of dispute settlement specified in
paragraph 2 of the April 2001 CCSBT Resolution, which includes referral
to arbitration. Because both sides to the dispute already have reached an
agreement when the Resolution was adopted and the diplomatic notes were
exchanged, there exists a legal base for referring to arbitration. However
possible problems are: whether this arbitration includes the Permanent
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Court of Arbitration stipulated in Annex 1 of the Convention for the
Conservation and Management of the Highly Migratory Species in
the Western and Central Pacific, the Arbitral Tribunal constituted in
accordance with Annex VII of the 1982 UNCLOS, or does it mean
general arbitral tribunal only? If it is referred to the Permanent Court of
Arbitration or the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal of the UNCLOS, do Taiwan
and CCSBT members have the right, based on Article 290, paragraph 1
of paragraph 5, of the UNCLOS, to request the prescription of provisional
measures in the case?
To answer the aforementioned questions, in the first place, it should be
noted that the five existing members of the CCSBT Extended Commission,
excluding Taiwan, have all ratified the UNCLOS, and are contracting
parties to this Convention. However, only Australia in 2002 has made a
declaration choosing dispute settlement methods in accordance with
Article 287 of the UNCLOS; and Taiwan is still not a party to the
UNCLOS because of political factors involved. When a dispute arises
regarding the interpretation or implementation of the SBT Convention
and the April 2001 CCSBT Resolution, it must go through arbitration
according to Article 287(4) of the UNCLOS, which provides that "[i]f
the parties to a dispute have accepted the same procedure for the
settlement of the dispute, it may be submitted only to that procedure,
unless the parties otherwise agree." However if Taiwan interprets
paragraph 2 of the April 2001 CCSBT Resolution regarding dispute
settlement methods to include referral to ITLOS, and other CCSBT
members do not believe it includes ITLOS and insist on referral to
arbitration, a dispute thus arises. In this kind of dispute, Article 287(5) of
the UNCLOS provides: "If the parties to a dispute have not accepted the
same procedure for the settlement of the dispute, it may be submitted
only to arbitration in accordance with Annex VII, unless the parties
otherwise agree." And Article 291 of the UNCLOS explicitly provides
that "[t]he dispute settlement procedures specified in this Part shall be
open to entities other than States Parties only as specifically provided for
in this Convention." Moreover, Article 13 of Annex VII of UNCLOS
reads: "The provisions of this Annex shall apply mutatis mutandis to any
dispute involving entities other than States Parties." Thus, even though
Taiwan is not a party to the UNCLOS, the arbitration regulations
provided in the Annex VII and Annex VI of the UNCLOS also apply to
disputes arising between Taiwan and CCSBT members. The disputes
concerning the right of Taiwan to participate in the CCSBT activities

related to SBT conservation and management, the duty of other CCSBT
members to cooperate with Taiwan, and the right and interest of Taiwan
to be allocated, without any discrimination, the national quotas of the
TAC of SBT as yearly decided by the Commission, are all closely related
to the objective of adopting the UNCLOS, and the relevant provisions of the
UNFSA. Thus, after a dispute occurs between Taiwan and other CCSBT
member states, is thereafter submitted to the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, and this Court considers that it has primafacie jurisdiction
according to Part XV of the UNCLOS, the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, before making a final ruling, may prescribe any provisional
measures which it considers appropriate under the circumstances to
preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute or to prevent
serious harm to the marine environment.
Alternatively, after a dispute occurs between Taiwan and other CCSBT
members, which is submitted for arbitration, and before the composition
of the arbitral court or tribunal, any courts (the Permanent Court of
Arbitration or ITLOS) agreed to by the parties to the dispute, if failing to
come to agreement within two weeks from the date of the request for
provisional measures, and if it is considered that the arbitral tribunal
which is to be constituted would have primafacie jurisdiction, and that
the urgency of the situation so requires, ITLOS can prescribe provisional
measures according to Article 290 of the UNCLOS. Once the arbitral
court or tribunal, which is to rule on the dispute between Taiwan and
other CCSBT member states, is constituted, it may modify, revoke or
affirm the provisional measures prescribed previously in accordance
with Article 290, paragraphs 1 to 4, of the UNCLOS. In addition, based
on the fact that Taiwan is not a party to 1982 UNCLOS, the judicial
practice of the Annex VII Arbitration Tribunal in the Southern Bluefin
Tuna Case (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), and the lack of an agreement
that can be applied to the dispute between Taiwan and CCSBT members
for using the compulsory dispute procedure, it is unlikely to adopt the
mandatory dispute settlement procedure when a dispute occurs between
Taiwan and other CCSBT member states.
2. CCSBT Members are not Willing to Refer Disputesfor Arbitration
In the event of a dispute arising between Taiwan and CCSBT members
related to the above-mentioned hypothetical situation, the two sides to
the dispute should follow the dispute resolution methods provided in
paragraph 2 the April 2001 CCSBT Resolution to settle their differences,
including referral to arbitration. Once Taiwan requests such arbitration, but
the CCSBT members of the parties to the dispute refuse Taiwan's
proposal for arbitration, then the CCSBT member states who are parties
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to the dispute would have contravened the regulation of dispute settlement
provided in the April 2001 CCSBT Resolution.
3. CCSBT Members Agree to Adopt JudicialSettlement Methods
In the event of a dispute arising between Taiwan and CCSBT members
related to the above-mentioned hypothetical arguments, and the two
sides of the dispute are to settle the dispute in accordance with the procedure
specified in paragraph 2 of the April 2001 CCSBT Resolution, is there a
possibility to refer the dispute to ITLOS or the ICJ for judicial settlement?
As noted earlier, Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations, not a
party to the ICJ Statute, and also not a party to the UNCLOS. Thus it is
unlikely to refer the dispute to the ICJ for resolution. However, if the
disputing parties of Taiwan and CCSBT members agree to refer their
disputes to ITLOS according to the wording "or other peaceful means
agreed by the Parties to the dispute" contained in paragraph 2 of the
April 2001 CCSBT Resolution, then, according to the direct
application and interpretation of the legal clause, this method of judicial
settlement for resolving a dispute between Taiwan and other CCSBT
member states is possible. Under these circumstances, ITLOS should
have jurisdiction over this case.
4. CCSBT Members Do Not Agree to Adopt
Methods ofJudicialSettlement
In a case where a dispute arises between Taiwan and CCSBT members,
and the CCSBT members who are parties to the dispute do not agree to
adopt methods of judicial settlement, Taiwan has no means to change the
CCSBT member states' decision, mainly because under paragraph 2 of
the April 2001 CCSBT Resolution, apart from negotiation, inquiry,
mediation, conciliation and arbitration, the parties to the dispute must
agree to adopt peaceful means of judicial settlement, that includes
referral to ITLOS.
5. The Request of a Third-Partyfor Intervention
In the event that a dispute occurs between Taiwan and CCSBT members,
and the two sides of the dispute agree to adopt the means of judicial
settlement, namely referral to ITLOS for judgment, then, according to
Article 31(1) of the ITLOS Statute, which reads: "[s]hould a State Party

consider that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by
the decision in any dispute, it may submit a request to the Tribunal to be
permitted to intervene." Whether the request of a third party for
intervention in the case is permitted is decided by ITLOS. If a request to
intervene is granted, the decision of the Tribunal in respect of the dispute
should be binding upon the intervening state party in so far as it relates
to matters in respect of which that state party requests to intervene.100 In
addition, according to Article 32(2) of the ITLOS Statute, no matter
when, if according to Article 21 or 22 of the Annex VII of UNCLOS, there
arises doubt about the interpretation or application of an international
agreement in question, the Registrar of the ITLOS must notify all of
the state parties to that agreement. Article 32(3) of this same Statute
also provides that: "[e]very party referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 has
the right to intervene in the proceedings; if it uses this right, the
interpretation given by the judgment will be equally binding upon it."
Therefore once Taiwan and a CCSBT member, who are parties to a
dispute, conclude a special agreement, agreeing to refer their dispute to
ITLOS for settlement, it is possible for China to submit a request for
intervention in the case in accordance with Articles 31 and 32 of the
ITLOS Statute. However, Professor Bernard H. Oxman believes that,
according to Articles 20 and 21 of the ITLOS Statute, if: (1) a dispute
occurs between Taiwan and another country, which involves the
interpretation or implementation of an agreement that is concluded
between states and Taiwan or between international governmental
organisations and Taiwan; (2) the above-mentioned agreement that binds
Taiwan's participation in the international organization concerned
correlates with the management objectives of the UNCLOS; and 3) this
agreement gives ITLOS jurisdiction over the dispute. Under the
aforementioned circumstances, the regulations provided in the UNCLOS
clearly give ITLOS jurisdiction over entities other than state parties.
Therefore, the exercise of the jurisdiction by ITLOS over the case
involving Taiwan "would not depend on, and would neither confirm nor
prejudice, any underlying juridical or political position regarding the
present or future international status or competence of Taiwan."' 0 ' This
opinion means, according to the text of the 1982 UNCLOS, that ITLOS,
other governments, or other third parties that are interested in the case
involving Taiwan, will not be forced to deal with those fundamental

100.
101.

See ITLOS, supra note 1, art. 13(2)(3).
Bernard H. Oxman, Does the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

Have Jurisdiction over Disputes with Taiwan? 16 (Dec. 10, 2004) (unpublished manuscript,

presented at International Symposium on the Law of the Sea and Taiwan, on file with
author).
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legal or political issues in relation to Taiwan's international legal
standing or competence under international law before turning to the
question of whether ITLOS can exercise jurisdiction over the dispute
involving Taiwan in accordance with Article 20, paragraph 2, and
Article 21 of the ITLOS Statute. Professor Oxman further points out that
the aforementioned opinion does not mean that those parties (such as
China) with strongly held opinions or high interest in the dispute
involving Taiwan and the question concerning whether ITLOS has
jurisdiction over the dispute would remain silent on the issue of
Taiwan's legal status in this context. But it is quite another matter to
suppose that the sensitive issue concerning Taiwan would be raised by
ITLOS itself proprio motu, or by a party to the dispute, or by a third
party that requests for intervention pursuant to Article 31 or 32 of the
ITLOS Statute. And even if this issue were raised, Professor Oxman
argues, "it is also not clear that the Tribunal would address it, let alone
decide it.' 10 2 Professor Oxman suspects that many people believe that
questions
ITLOS should address the fundamental legal or political
03
related to Taiwan's international status and competence.'
Now, if a dispute arises between Taiwan and a WCPFC member
regarding the interpretation or implementation of the Convention for the
Conservation and Management of the Highly Migratory Species the
Western and Central Pacific, although according to Annex 1 of the
Convention, disputes should be referred to the Permanent Court of
Arbitration for settlement, however the provisions provided in Annex I
does not exclude Taiwan and another WCPFC member from reaching
another agreement for the purpose of resolving the dispute. For example,
it is possible for Taiwan to sign a special agreement with the Solomon
Islands and the Marshall Islands, with which it has diplomatic relations,
regarding the referral of disputes to ITLOS for settlement. Can China
then request intervention in the said dispute pursuant to Articles 31 or 32
of the ITLOS Stature? Under these circumstances, according to Articles
20, paragraph 2, and Article 21 of the ITLOS Statute, ITLOS has jurisdiction
over the said dispute, and at the same time the rejection of China's
request for intervention by ITLOS is highly possible.

102.
103.

Id. at 17.
Id.

6. The Jurisdictionof ITLOS over Requestsfor
Prompt Release of Crews and Vessels
As pointed out in Section IV of this paper, according to Article 292(1)
of the UNCLOS, ITLOS has jurisdiction over disputes concerning the
detention and prompt release of fishing vessels. If Taiwan's Coast Guard
Administration detains a vessel flying the Japanese flag within the
Taiwanese EEZ, and according to the Japanese claim, that Taiwan fails
to release promptly the detained Japanese vessel and its crew members
in accordance with the regulations provided for in the UNCLOS after
posting a reasonable bond or other financial security by the Japanese
owners of the detained vessel, could Japan submit a request to ITLOS,
ordering Taiwan to promptly release the detained vessel because Japan
and Taiwan were not able to reach an agreement regarding the prompt
release of the detained vessel and crew members within ten days from
the time of detention and the lack of any other agreements? The answer
to this hypothetical question should be negative. As Article 292(1) of the
UNCLOS applies to states parties to the Convention, the detaining
country of Taiwan is not a party to the UNCLOS, and therefore ITLOS
should not have jurisdiction over the case.
However, if the detained vessel is flying the flag of the Marshall
Islands, but the ship owner or shipping company is Taiwanese, the sea
area in which it is detained is the EEZ of Japan, and Japan is the
detaining country, then does ITLOS have jurisdiction over the request
for prompt release of this vessel and its crew members? This hypothetical
situation is further explained as follows: A vessel is registered under the
flag of the Marshall Islands, but owned or operated by Taiwanese fishing
company as a FOC vessel. The vessel is found fishing in the EEZ of
Japan and is therefore detained by the Japanese authority. However, after
posting a reasonable bond or other financial security, Japan fails to
release promptly the detained vessel and its crew members within ten
days from the time of detention in accordance with the relevant
regulations provided for in the UNCLOS. In a further hypothesis, if
Japan and the Marshall Islands both fail to reach agreement regarding
the prompt release of the vessel and its crew members within ten days
from the time of detention of this ship and both sides do not have any
other agreements then, according to Article 292, paragraphs 1 and 2, of
the UNCLOS, which provides that "[t]he application for release may be
made only by or on behalf of the flag State of the vessel," the Marshall
Islands is entitled to make a request to ITLOS for prompt release of
vessels and its crews because the Marshall Islands is also a contracting
party to the UNCLOS. As for Taiwan and Japan, whether Japan may

[VOL. 8: 37, 20061

InternationalTribunalfor the Law of the Sea
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.

reach another agreement with the Marshall Islands, and whether the
Marshall Islands is willing to submit its request for the prompt release of
a vessel and its crew members to ITLOS, these are other issues. In
actuality, according to Article 280 of the UNCLOS, Japan and the
Marshall Islands can at any time settle a dispute between them concerning
the interpretation or application of the UNCLOS by any peaceful means
of their own choice, and this includes the application of Article 292 of
the UNCLOS, as well as choosing ITLOS as the judicial body to resolve
the dispute.
VIII. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the provisions of the UNCLOS, and Articles 20(2)
and 21 of the ITLOS Statute, the Tribunal is indeed open to entities other
than States Parties to the UNCLOS, which should include Taiwan
regarded as a fishing entity. It can be argued that based on a broader
interpretation of the wording "any other agreement' contained in
Articles 20(2) and 21 of the ITLOS Statute, the April 2001 CCSBT
Resolution and the Exchange of Letters inviting Taiwan to apply to
become a member of the CCSBT Extended Commission and Extended
Scientific Committee done in December 2001 should be treated as such
"any other agreement." Due to the fact that the diplomatic exchange of
notes between the government of Taiwan and CCSBT must complete the
required domestic legal procedures in order to become effective, namely
obtaining the consent from the Taiwanese legislature and signed by its
President, this Exchange of Letters should be consider an effective legal
document exchanged by Taiwan and an international governmental fishery
management organization, namely the CCSBT. Even so interpreted, if
ITLOS is to exercise jurisdiction over a dispute submitted to it by the
disputing parties of Taiwan and other CCSBT member states or other
members of the CCSBT Extended Commission over the interpretation
and application of the SBT Convention, the April 2001 CCSBT
Resolution, and the SBT conservation or management measures decided
by the Commission for settlement, it must be answered in positive
regarding the question whether the wording "or other peaceful means
agreed by the parties to the dispute" contained in paragraph 2 of the
April 2001 CCSBT Resolution also include the means of judicial
settlement. Because Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations, and
is not a contracting party to the ICJ Statute, if the disputing parties of
Taiwan and a CCSBT member or Extended Commission member agree

to refer the dispute for judicial settlement, there is a greater possibility to
refer the dispute to ITLOS for settlement. But to return to the crux of the
matter, if ITLOS is to exercise jurisdiction over this dispute, it must be
that Taiwan and a CCSBT member both agree to refer their dispute to
ITLOS for trial. This required a special agreement concluded by both
sides to the dispute. However given the fact that Japan made a
declaration in April 2001 when the Resolution to Establish an Extended
Committee and Extended Scientific Committee was adopted, which
interpreted the Exchange of Letters between Taiwan and the CCSBT as
not an exchange of diplomatic documents, 1°4 it is more likely to see
Japan adopt a much narrower or stricter position in interpreting and
implementing the April 2001 CCSBT Resolution than that of Australia or
New Zealand. But no matter how the disputing parties of Taiwan and a
CCSBT member or an Extended Commission member agree to refer
their disputes to ITLOS for trial, there is no doubt that ITLOS has
jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Articles 280 and 291 of the
UNCLOS, and Articles 20(2) and 21 of the ITLOS Statute.
In addition, if ITLOS is to exercise jurisdiction over a dispute between
Taiwan and CCSBT members or Extended Committee members arising
from the interpretation and implementation of the SBT Convention, the
April 2001 CCSBT Resolution, and the CCSBT conservation and
management measures, it is also possible to rely on Article 22 of the
ITLOS Statute. That is, ITLOS has jurisdiction over the dispute mainly
because the contracting parties of Japan, Australia, New Zealand and
South Korea agree to refer the dispute to ITLOS for settlement, and Taiwan
also does not object. Although based entirely on the legal interpretation
of the relevant provisions or regulations, it can be established that the
dispute between Taiwan and other CCSBT members or CCSBT Extended
Commission members can be referred to ITLOS in accordance with
Article 22 of the ITLOS Statute for resolution, in actual operation, due to
political considerations, whether Japan, Australia, New Zealand and South
Korea really agree to refer disputes involving Taiwan to ITLOS for trial
will be not so easy to overcome.
Finally, once China makes a request for intervention in a dispute
between Taiwan and other CCSBT member states in accordance with
Articles 31 or 32 of the ITLOS Statute, according to the opinion of some
foreign international legal scholars and this author, the possibility of
accepting the Chinese request for third party intervention by ITLOS is
not great. Due to the fact that Taiwan was invited as a fishing entity to
become a member of the CCSBT Extended Commission and Extended
104.
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Scientific Committee, and together with the application of the April
2001 CCSBT Resolution and the Exchange of Letters between Taiwan
and the CCSBT, as well as an agreement having been reached between
the disputing parties of Taiwan and other CCSBT members or CCSBT
Extended Commission members to refer their disputes to ITLOS for
settlement, it is not likely for ITLOS to agree to consider simultaneously
the legal and political issues related to Taiwan's international legal
standing when the Tribunal is dealing with the case. Therefore, it is very
much likely that ITLOS will reject China's request for a third party
intervention pursuant to Articles 31 and 32 of the ITLOS Statute.
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